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 In theory, forensic science provides objective, dispassionate evidence in 
criminal justice proceedings often charged with emotion, cognitive biases 
and the failings of human recollection.  By being theoretically objective and 
independent from other actors and processes in the criminal justice process, 
forensic science has the potential to make the criminal process more 
reliable by reducing both wrongful convictions and unsolved crimes.   
 But how does it work in practice? Its leading role in many wrongful 
convictions suggests caution. To better understand the actual role of 
forensic science, we collected data on the prevalence and use of forensic 
evidence in five jurisdictions in multiple stages of the criminal process.  We 
also analyzed existing data on crime labs and conducted an experimental 
survey of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys to measure the effect 
of forensic evidence on the plea-bargaining process.  
 Our findings are sobering.  Forensic evidence is (still) being analyzed 
in only a small fraction of cases in which it is available. While forensic 
evidence is regularly used in homicides, its use is highly limited by resource 
constraints, resulting in long turnaround times for less serious offenses, 
which encourage police and prosecutors to rely on other types of evidence.  
When it is used, it is often tested late in the criminal process, sometimes to 
meet juror expectations.  While an understandable reaction to limited 
forensic resources, this late timing may lead to both unsolved crimes and 
pressure to conform to preexisting theories of guilt. 
 Despite the theoretical potential of forensic science to improve the 
reliability of the criminal process, the way it is actually used squanders 
many of its advantages.  As a result, the potential of forensic evidence to 
improve the criminal process remains largely unrealized. 
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“The darkened courtroom; the awed silence of the assembly; the intense mental strain on those 
more deeply interested; the awful force of the blow to the guilty man when he first beholds the 
evidence of his crime illumined by the light of scientific test.” 1   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In theory, forensic science offers considerable promise to increase the 
reliability of the criminal justice system.  Supplementing the vagaries of human 
memory and the suspicions of police with a scientific process that is more 
objective should increase accuracy and reliability.2  The forensic science process 
is, at least potentially, also independent of much of the rest of the criminal process.  
As a result of both the objectivity and the independence, the forensic science 
process should serve as a check on the inevitable human errors that infuse the 
criminal justice process.3   
 Unfortunately, the potential for both scientific objectivity and independence 
are not always realized in practice.4  Scientific objectivity has been called into 
question by shoddy lab practices, exaggerated conclusions, practices that have 
little scientific basis, and may not be subject to meaningful peer review.    
Similarly, forensic lab personnel may be beholden to law enforcement with few 
outside career options in a way that may limit their theoretical independence. 
 In order to improve the use of forensic science and help realize its theoretical 
promise to improve the criminal process, we must better understand how it works 
                                                 
1 Percy Edwards, Chemical Experts—A Trio of Important Factors in the Detection of Crime, 42 
CENT. L.J. 323, 323 (1896). 
2 Joseph Peterson, S. Mihaljlovic, and M. Gilliand, FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND THE POLICE: THE 
EFFECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1984) (clearance rates of 
offenses with evidence scientifically analyzed were about three times greater than in cases where 
such evidence was not used); John Roman, S. Reid, J. Reid, A. Chalfin, W. Adams, and C. 
Knight, THE DNA FIELD EXPERIMENT: COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DNA IN 
THE INVESTIGATION OF HIGH VOLUME CRIMES, 2008 (solution rates of property crime and 
prosecution rate were twice as high when DNA evidence was collected as when it was not); M. 
Briody, The Effects of DNA Evidence on the Criminal Justice Process (2004) (homicide cases 
with DNA evidence more likely to be prosecuted and juries more likely to convict). Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History of Expert 
Evidence 52 VILLANOVA L. REV. 101, 133 (noting that this has long been the case: “Science, 
with its promise of disinterested observation and objectivity, seemed to offer a promising 
method for generating dispositive evidence.”). 
3 See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984) 
(noting importance of independent uncoupled systems to increase system reliability); James M. 
Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 
(2010) (calling for criminal law to view wrongful convictions as organizational accidents and to 
create, like medicine and aviation, a culture of safety); James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How 
Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case 
Outcomes, 122 YALE L. J. 154, 208-212 (2012) (arguing that criminal justice system should be 
seen as a process that should be made robust to inevitable human error). 
4 See Itiel Dror, Biases in Forensic Experts, 360 SCIENCE 243 (2018). 




in practice.  This is particularly true as new technological developments like small 
automated DNA testing machines proliferate. Unfortunately, the existing 
literature on this topic is sparse.   
 Older research suggests that apart from homicides, forensic evidence was 
collected and tested in small fraction of cases in which it is available.5 Even in 
cases in which forensic evidence was used it was not typically analyzed until after 
a suspect has been arrested -- meaning that forensic evidence played no role in 
initially identifying a suspect, arguably the stage at which objective evidence is 
most critical.6  One of the reasons that forensic evidence was underused was that 
the quantity of unanalyzed or “backlogged” evidence was staggering,7  which 
suggests that forensic evidence was not being efficiently collected or analyzed. 
But are backlogs the result of valuable evidence that was untested or the 
overcollection of useless evidence, or both?8   
                                                 
5 Joseph Peterson, Ira Sommers, Deborah Baskin, and Donald Johnson, THE ROLE AND IMPACT 
OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 8 (2010) (for study using crime data 
from 2003, noting that with exception of homicides, “overall percent of reported crime incidents 
that had physical evidence examined in crime labs was low.” For aggravated assaults in the 
study sample, evidence was collected in 30.3% of cases and examined in 9.2%; for burglaries the 
corresponding rates were 19.6% and 9.2%; for rapes, 63.8% and 18.6%, 24.8% and 9.9%, but for 
homicides, the rates were 97% and 81% )  In recent years, the use of DNA evidence in property 
crimes has increased somewhat.  John K. Roman, Shannon Reid, Jay Reid, Aaron Chalfin, 
William Adams, Carly Knight, ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DNA IN THE INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-
VOLUME CRIMES (2008).  However, most crime labs still treat property crime as a low priority.  
For example, the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services DNA case acceptance criteria explicitly state 
that crimes against persons will be given priority over property crimes, and that only two items 
of evidence may be submitted for each property crime. 
6 Peterson et al. supra note 5.  Historically, even fingerprint evidence was seldom used to 
identify suspects. Peter W. Greenwood, THE RAND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION STUDY: ITS 
FINDINGS AND IMPACTS TO DATE 4 (1979) (“The reason for this surprising finding [that 
fingerprint recovery rate was unrelated to case solution] appeared to be that most police 
departments did not have adequate resources devoted to their latent search capability.  They 
were unable to utilize those prints that were lifted.  In most departments, latent prints were only 
utilized to confirm the identity of a suspect which had been established in some other way.”) 
One study noted that the most frequently cited reason for the lack of forensic testing (even in 
cases where DNA evidence was available) was the lack of a suspect.  Kevin J. Strom & Matthew 
J. Hickman, Unanalyzed Evidence in Law Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of 
Forensic Processing in Police Departments, 9 Criminology and Public Policy 381 (2010) 
(Numerous unsolved homicide and rape cases contained forensic evidence (including DNA) that 
had not been submitted to laboratory; Lack of a suspect in the case was most frequently cited 
reason for not submitting forensic evidence for analysis). 
7 Mark Nelson, MAKING SENSE OF DNA BACKLOGS, 2010—MYTHS VS. REALITY (National 
Institute of Justice 2011) ; Matthew Durose CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME 
LABORATORIES, 2005, (2008) (noting that typical laboratory performing DNA testing begun 
2005 with 86 backlogged requests for DNA analysis and finished the year with a backlog of 152 
requests”). 
8 See e.g. Jessica Genza, Victim’s Hopes for Justice Fade as Rape Kits are Routinely Ignored or 
Destroyed, The Guardian, November 10, 2015 (chronicling cases of police discarding rape kits); 
As Nelson, supra noted, “more research is needed to completely understand how law 
enforcement decide to submit or not submit evidence to a laboratory, what proportion of open 




 More recently, crime laboratories have experienced considerable growth.9 In 
addition, the popularity of forensic evidence and analysis has continued to 
increase among the general public, due in part to fictional television programs, 
romanticizing the role of forensic science in solving crimes.  Some prosecutors 
have expressed concern that these shows give jurors unrealistic expectations for 
conclusive and easy to understand forensic evidence in criminal cases, termed the 
“CSI Effect.”10  How these perceptions of forensic evidence influence police 
collection of evidence and attorneys’ decisions to resolve a case through plea 
bargaining or trial has not been previously explored.  
 We also know little about how the influence of particular types of forensic 
evidence differentially influences attorneys’ plea-bargaining decisions.  Do pieces 
of forensic evidence that are more individualizing (e.g. DNA evidence) have more 
influence on plea bargaining decisions that pieces of evidence that are more 
associative (e.g., tire tread patterns)?  Does a more complete DNA match produce 
different plea bargain/trial decisions as opposed to a partial DNA match?  How 
sensitive is the plea bargaining process to the strength of the evidence?  
 As noted above, serious questions about the way in which forensic science is 
practiced have also been raised. False or misleading forensic science testimony is 
an important factor in many wrongful convictions.11  The National Academy of 
                                                 
cases could benefit from forensic testing and how cases should be prioritized for testing.” Id. at 
5. 
9 Between 2002 and 2009, full-time personnel employed at publicly-funded crime laboratories 
increased 19 percent, total budgets increased 60 percent, and the number of requests for analysis 
rose from 2.7 million to 4.1 million. Matthew Durose et al., Census of Publicly Funded Crime 
Laboratories, 2009, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2012). Forensic biology casework requests 
jumped from 61,000 to 343,000.  Durose, supra note 35 and Matthew Durose, Census of 
Publicly Funded Crime Laboratories, 2005, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008). 
10See Donald Shelton, A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific 
Evidence: Does the ‘CSI Effect’ Exist? 9 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 330 (2006); 
Kimberlianne Podlas, The CSI Effect and Other Forensic Fictions, 27 LOYOLA ENT. L. REV. 87 
(2006); Dennis Stevens, Forensic Science, Wrong Convictions, and American Prosecutor 
Discretion, 47 HOWARD J. OF CRIM. J. 31 (2008) (noting that some jurors possessed unrealistic 
expectations about forensic analyses);Kathianne Boniella, CSI has Ruinied the American Justice 
System, THE NEW YORK POST, September 27, 2015 (interviewing prosecutors and defense 
counsel about changing juror expecations in criminal cases). 
11 See e.g. Kelly Servick, Sizing Up the Evidence, 351 SCIENCE 1130 (2016) (noting widespread 
problems in many disciplines of forensic science widely used by FBI and other forensic 
laboratories, particularly with respect to forensic scientists overstating strength of evidence 
against defendant; Mike Wagner & Lucas Sullivan, Defense Attorneys Launch Review of 
Forensic Scientist’s Cases,  THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Friday, November 4, 2016 (noting 
problems with work of forensic scientist that favored police and prosecutors and led to several 
wrongful convictions); Mark Hansen, Long-Held Beliefs about Arson Science have been 
Debunked after Decades of Misuse, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, December 2015 
(forensic evidence at heart of prosecution’s arson case was debunked by post-trial scientific 
developments); Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 204-21 (2000) (chronicling 
role of “junk science” in wrongful convictions); Dahlia Lithwick, Crime Lab Scandals Just Keep 
Getting Worse, SLATE October 29, 2015 (Massachusetts crime lab analyst admitted to falsifying 
thousands of drug tests;  noting that crime lab scandals have occurred in 20 states and the FBI); 




Sciences and the National Research Council have criticized both the scientific 
basis of some widely-used forensic science disciplines and the way in which they 
are presented in the courtroom. 12  The President’s Council on Science and 
Technology was also highly critical of the use of comparison methods in forensic 
science.13  Others have noted the gap in cultures between forensic scientists, who 
typically know in advance what police and prosecutors are hoping to prove, and 
other scientists, who use double-blind studies to guard against confirmation bias.14  
Commentators have suggested a variety of remedies including making labs 
independent and requiring standardized laboratory and analyst certification.15 Yet 
we lack basic knowledge of how independence or certification affects the 
production and use of forensic science.  
 In short, there is a pressing need for research on how forensic evidence is 
gathered, tested, used, and presented from the moment that a crime occurs to the 
ultimate resolution of the case.  Many important research questions have not been 
addressed, and recent changes in forensic science (most notably increased DNA 
testing capacity and database maturation) suggest that past studies could usefully 
be updated. 
 We therefore conducted an empirical study of the production and use of 
forensic evidence in five jurisdictions across the United States with different 
models of forensic labs and needs. The study included qualitative interviews with 
police, prosecutors, and crime lab personnel; the collection and analysis of a 
random sample of approximately 1000 crimes reported in each jurisdiction.  We 
complemented this study with an analysis of existing national crime lab data and 
an experimental survey of prosecutors and defense counsel to estimate the 
incremental effect of forensic evidence on the plea-bargaining process.   
 We found that even after recent efforts at expanding lab facilities, forensic 
evidence is still rarely analyzed prior to arrest and charging.  Instead it is often 
used more to strengthen existing cases and meet juror expectations than as a tool 
to identify suspects or confirm guilt. This is partly a function of the political 
                                                 
see also Caitlin Plummber & Imran Syed, ‘Shifted Science’ and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 259 (2012) (discussing problems that developments in science poses for criminal 
justice system which seeks finality). 
12 National Research Council, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD, 2009. 
13 Executive Office of the President: President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY 
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016). 
14 Michael J. Saks and Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science 309 SCIENCE 892, 893 (2005) (noting “cultural differences between 
normal science and forensic science.  In normal science, academically gifted students receive 
four or more years of doctoral training where much of the socialization into the culture of 
science takes place.  This culture emphasizes methodological rigor, openness, and cautious 
interpretation of data.  In forensic science, 96% of positions are held by persons with bachelor’s 
degrees (or less), 3 percent master’s degrees, and 1 percent PhDs.  When individuals who are not 
steeped in the culture of science work in an adversarial, crime-fighting culture, there is a 
substantial risk that a different set of norms will prevail.”) 
15 Radley Balko and Roger Koppl, C.S.Oy, SLATE, August 12, 2008. 




economy of forensic testing, in which cases that are going to trial are prioritized 
over cases that are under investigation. The case disposition probabilities 
associated with different categories of forensic evidence testing varied 
substantially, but was often not statistically significant.  Forensic testing may 
often be the result of a strong case rather than an independent cause of a strong 
case. We also found that collection and use of forensic evidence varied widely 
across jurisdictions. 
 Our plea-bargaining study showed that forensic evidence has a significant 
effect on attorneys’ perception of the strength of the case and likelihood of 
accepting a plea bargain.  We also found that the use of an information 
management system and fee-based laboratory funding are associated with 
increased clearance rates, which suggest that using information technology and a 
pricing system to prioritize forensic testing may reduce lab backlogs. 
 Overall, we found that forensic evidence was used in a small fraction of the 
cases in which it was available, and that when testing occurred, it was often late 
in the criminal justice process.  This was most likely the result of limited lab 
capacity and an understandable desire to prioritize testing for cases that were 
going to trial.  But this has the effect of significantly reducing the availability of 
forensic evidence at the stage of the criminal process where its objectivity could 
be most useful – the initial investigation.  By testing forensic science late in the 
process, it also puts lab personnel under considerable pressure to confirm the 
prosecution’s theory of the case.   While we don’t doubt the probity and ethics of 
the vast majority of forensic lab personnel, the absence of double-blind testing 
and the system itself puts considerable pressure on them and may be a contributing 
factor to the problems with forensic science that have been noted by many.  
Policymakers may wish to consider ways to increase lab capacity and integrate 
forensic tools into the investigatory process at an earlier stage.   
 The Article is organized as follows.  We first explain the systems approach to 
the criminal justice and the considerable theoretical promise of forensic evidence 
to reduce serious error. After a short review of the existing literature, we 
summarize our methodology and present our principal findings.  After discussing 
these findings, we conclude with the policy implications. 
I.  THE ERROR REDUCTION PROMISE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 
 
At an abstract level, the criminal justice system can be viewed as a 
diagnostic system that is designed to reliably determine if a particular person 
committed a particular act.    Of course, it has many other constraints, 
constitutional, legal, and ethical, but it is difficult to conceive of a satisfactory 
criminal justice system that does not have this as at least a key goal.   Conceived 
thus, there are two kinds of important errors – convicting someone who did not 
commit the act and an unsolved case.  We may debate over the importance of 
minimizing each kind of error, but both can be seen as errors that should be 
minimized.  A critical tenet of this approach is that the system itself should be 




designed to anticipate the inevitable human error and still yield accurate 
outcomes.16  
 Other professions and industries, from engineering, to aviation, to medicine, 
to car manufacturing, are far ahead of the legal profession in trying to design 
systems that are more robust to the inevitable human error and still reach a reliable 
outcome. 17  The legal profession’s heroizing of the fiercely independent solo 
practitioner may exacerbate this danger and serve as an obstacle to a more 
systems-based approach.18 
Other professions have adopted quality assurance methods in an effort to 
minimize error and increase efficiency rather than to any commitment to justice 
or the rule of law. Ironically, the legal profession’s lofty commitments to these 
abstractions may have obscured its concrete failures to achieve more reliable 
practices—practices that would actually help achieve justice. Despite lawyers’ 
beliefs that they are doing justice and not making widgets, breaking down 
achieving justice into concrete steps would be useful. In this respect, the legal 
profession may have much to learn from efforts in other fields to develop reliable 
processes. For example, Strickland v. Washington focuses on the “ineffectiveness” 
of a particular individual lawyer—blaming an individual for an error. In contrast, 
the Institute of Medicine urged that in order to reduce medical errors, “[t]he focus 
must shift from blaming individuals for past errors to a focus on preventing future 
errors by designing safety into the system.”19    
In any event, forensic science has considerable promise to reduce errors in this 
systems approach.  First, it is an additional source of information that can provide 
probative evidence in many situations to make the system more reliable even 
when there is no additional information to be gleaned from other sources of 
information about an event.  This can help reduce both unsolved cases and 
wrongful convictions.   
                                                 
16 Authors have made similar arguments in the context of another complex system for delivering 
services, healthcare. See, e.g., ERROR REDUCTION IN HEALTHCARE (Patrice L. Spath ed., 2000) 
(urging focus on systems rather than individual actors to reduce errors); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 49 (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & 
Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN] (same); 
Donald M. Berwick, Sounding Board, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 53 (1989) (calling for application of industrial techniques of quality 
improvement to healthcare); Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1854 (1994); 
cf. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984) 
(noting inevitability of human error in complex systems). 
17 See e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2009) 
(calling for the use of checklists to minimize human error in medicine and chronicling other 
attempts to do same). See also James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 
100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) (calling for criminal law to view wrongful convictions 
as organizational accidents and to create, like medicine and aviation, a culture of safety). 
18 Atticus Finch, the heroic sole practitioner of Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird (1960) is so 
revered by lawyers that the American Bar Association created its own category for him in its 
contest of most influential fictional attorneys. Farewell, Atticus, AM. BAR ASS’N J., Aug. 2010, 
www.abajournal.com/magazine/articles/farewell-atticus.  
19 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5. 





 Second, it is, at least in theory, objective and scientific.  In many instances, it 
may be more accurate than other categories of evidence.  At least in theory, the 
rate of error of the particular forensic technique can be also be accurately 
characterized and conveyed to the decision makers. 
 Third, the forensic science process is, at least in theory, independent of other 
parts of the criminal justice system.   Thus the errors in the forensic science system 
should be independent and uncorrelated with other errors in the system.   From an 
error reduction perspective, this is vital.   James Reason proposed the swiss cheese 







The best way to reduce errors is to have multiple independent screens so that there 
is not a single point of failure.  This defense in depth approach does not work 
unless the screens are independent.     
 In the criminal justice system, the police and the prosecution are the primary 
actors responsible for minimizing errors. 21  But they often work very closely 
together and until recently, there has been little focus on developing systemic error 
reduction strategies. 22   If the investigating officer, for example, mistakenly 
                                                 
20 James T. Reason, The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of complex 
systems. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY (London), series B. 327: 475-
484 (1990). 
21 Defense counsel are vital to prevent wrongful conviction errors but ordinarily play little role in 
solving cases.  Resource constraints and vast caseloads often undermine their ability to 
meaningfully serve as an independent check.  
22 But see James M. Doyle, NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative: Reducing Errors in the Criminal 
Justice System, Corrections 24-25 (2015) (viewing criminal justice system as system and noting 
National Institute of Justice to study wrongful convictions as critical errors from which we can 
learn). 




suspects the wrong person, based on an erroneous eyewitness identification, for 
example, a wrongful conviction may occur.  And the investigating officer plays a 
key role in interviewing witnesses, guiding the entire investigation and often 
playing a key role in the prosecution itself.   From a systems approach, this is a 
potentially risky single point of failure. 
 At least in theory, forensic science can help serve as an independent error 
reduction screen, to both develop information when the case is otherwise unsolved 
and to exculpate when the police have identified the wrong individual.  In this 
respect, it can play a vital role in improving the reliability of the criminal justice 
system, even in the face of the inevitable human error. 
 Finally, there is one advantage of forensic science that lies beyond the 
systems-based error reduction function outlined above.  To function well, the 
criminal justice system requires community faith in its operation.   Forensic 
evidence, may be perceived as more objective and scientific than other forms of 
evidence.  In the wake of police shootings of unarmed Black citizens, community 
faith in the integrity of the police and the criminal justice system more broadly 
has been shaken in the United States.  In other nations, police are viewed as 
corrupt.  In both cases, community members may doubt that the police conducted 
a fair investigation.  But if the forensic evidence process is reasonably perceived 
as more objective and scientific, and not as likely to be infected by corruption or 
misconduct, it may help increase the community faith in the criminal justice 
system that is vital to its functioning.  
 
II.       PAST EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE USE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 
 Since at least the late 19th century, courts have recognized the theoretical 
advantages of scientific testimony.  Jennifer Mnookin noted that as early as the 
late 19th century there was a belief that “scientific expert testimony should have 
been able to be a more reliable form of evidence, a more authoritative method for 
adducing knowledge than the other means available in court.”23 
  However, the available research notes how infrequently forensic evidence 
was utilized.  In 1963, Parker, for example, noted that scientific evidence was used 
in less than 1% of cases.24 Similarly, RAND’s 1975 study (by Greenwood et al.) 
found that forensic evidence had little role in the criminal justice system despite 
the fact that physical evidence of some kind was available in most cases, and 
fingerprint evidence in more than half.25 More recently, Peterson et al. found that, 
apart from homicide and rape, collection and testing of forensic evidence was 
                                                 
23 Mnookin, supra note 2 at 110 italics in original. 
24 B. Parker, The Status of Forensic Science in the Administration of Criminal Justice 32 Revista 
Juridica de la Universidad P.R. 405 (1963); see also Brian Parker and Joseph Peterson PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE UTILIZATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1972) (finding limited 
use of forensic evidence testing). 
25 PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, VOLUME III: 
OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS (RAND: 1975). 




rare.26 The study also noted that forensic science was used more often once a 
suspect had been identified rather than as a tool at the investigative stage.27 
 And, when forensic evidence was used, its impact was unclear. Baskin and 
Sommers examined the effect of forensic evidence on homicide case outcomes28 
and found no effect on the likelihood of arrest or subsequent judicial outcomes. 
Keel, Jarvis and Muirhead 29  and Wellford and Cronin 30  also concluded that 
forensic evidence had only a marginal effect on case disposition.31  
 Earlier studies seemed to find more of an effect.  Forst et al.32 found that post-
arrest, “tangible evidence” gathered during the investigation predicted 
convictions.33  Similarly, an archival analysis of actual criminal cases found that 
the probability of trial (versus a plea agreement) increased with the availability of 
expert testimony, which in this study included expert testimony on analyses from 
ballistic reports, etc.34 These studies provide little information, however, about 
exactly when, how, and why types of forensic evidence influence the adjudication 
process. 
 Peterson, Mihajlovic, and Gilliland35 compared a random selection of cases 
across several jurisdictions that used forensic evidence to similar cases that did 
not contain forensic evidence. They found that after controlling for a number of 
other variables, the cases that contained forensic evidence were closed three times 
                                                 
26 Peterson et al, supra note 23. 
27 The study was limited by the fact that all of the cases they gathered data on occurred prior to 
2005, and by the fact that they were limited to four jurisdictions in Indiana and Los Angeles. As 
they noted, “This research should be replicated and refined in other jurisdictions around the 
nation.  In particular, studies should expand and strengthen their qualitative components as they 
assess decision processes at important criminal justice decision levels;” Peterson, supra note 23, 
at. 9; see also MALCOLM RAMSAY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE 
(1987) (making same finding with respect to fact that forensic testing occurs after suspect 
identified). 
28 D. Baskin & I Sommers, The Influence of Forensic Evidence on the Case Outcomes of 
Homicide Incidents 38 J. of Crim. Just. 1141-1149 (2010). 
29 Timothy Keel et al, An Exploratory Analysis of Factors Affecting Homicide Investigations: 
Examining the Dynamics of Murder Clearance Rates, 13 HOMICIDE STUDIES 50 (2008). 
30 Charles Welford & James Cronin, Clearing up Homicide Clearance Rates, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE JOURNAL (2000). 
31 Several earlier studies attempted to model the effect of evidence on case outcomes. JAMES 
EINSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL 
COURTS (1977) (finding found that the stronger the evidence, the higher the chance of conviction 
and longer the sentence, but not separately noting forensic evidence); see also Floyd Feeney, 
Forrest Dill, and Adrianne W. Weir  ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR 
AND WHY, National Institute of Justice, 1983 (reaching similar conclusions). 
32 BRIAN FORST ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ARREST?: A COURT PERSPECTIVE OF POLICE 
OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1977). 
33 The operational definition of “tangible evidence” in this study, however, was not clearly 
defined. 
34 Martha Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of 
Court Resources 26 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 439 (1979). 
35 JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND THE POLICE: THE EFFECTS OF SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1984). 




more often than cases that did not include forensic evidence.   In another study, 
Peterson et al.36 found that cases containing strong forensic evidence against the 
accused resulted in fewer plea bargain offers by the prosecution.37  In contrast, if 
the case went to trial, forensic evidence had the most influence when evidence 
against the defendant was weak.  Forensic evidence in trial outcomes, however, 
was significantly less influential than other types of trial evidence.38   
 Most recently, Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, & Johnson39 tracked the collection 
and use of forensic evidence in the state of Indiana and the County of Los Angeles.  
The influence of forensic evidence depended on the crime examined.  For example, 
in aggravated assault cases, forensic evidence was not a significant predictor of 
plea bargaining decisions.  Plea bargaining rates in homicide cases with forensic 
evidence were similar to rates in homicide cases with no forensic evidence.  
However, certain types of forensic evidence, specifically biological evidence, 
latent prints, and firearms evidence, were present more often in homicide cases 
that went to trial than cases that were pled out.  In contrast, robbery cases 
containing forensic evidence were more likely to plead out (68%) than robbery 
cases that did not contain forensic evidence (36%). Plea bargaining rates in 
burglary cases were too high (95%) to identify differences based on forensic 
evidence.40 
 Other research41 has specifically examined the influence of DNA evidence on 
case outcomes by comparing outcomes in a sample of sexual offense cases 
containing DNA evidence to a matched sample of cases that did not contain DNA 
evidence.  While the presence of DNA evidence was a significant predictor of 
guilty verdicts at trial, DNA evidence did not predict guilty pleas.42  Briody’s 
research examining the influence of DNA on case outcomes in homicides 
produced similar findings.43  More recently, Shawn Bushway, Allison Redlich, 
and Robert Norris tested the “shadow of the trial” theory of plea bargaining by 
distributing varying hypothetical case files to prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
judges.  This permitted them to measure the effect of DNA and other kinds of 
non-forensic evidence on the outcome of plea bargaining.44 
 Although these studies have broken important ground, the lack of consistent 
findings in the literature leaves many questions as to how forensic evidence 
influences case outcomes.  Moreover, the most recent analysis of cases containing 
                                                 
36 Joseph Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony 
Cases, 32 J. of Forensic Sciences 1730 (1987). 
37 Peterson, supra note 36 
38 Peterson, supra note 36 
39 Peterson, supra note 23 
40 Peterson, supra note 23. 
41 Michael Briody, The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court, 14 CURRENT 
ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 159 (2002). 
42 Briody, supra note 41. 
43 Michael Briody, The Effects of DNA Evidence of the Criminal Justice Process (2004) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Griffeth University). 
44 Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert J. Morris, An Explicit Test of Plea 
Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014). 




forensic evidence45 examined cases that originated in 2003 and 2005, prior to the 
recent expansion in lab capacity and new attention being paid to forensic science.  
In short, many important research questions have not been addressed, and recent 
changes in forensic science (including increased DNA testing capacity) suggests 
that past studies could usefully be updated. 
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY  
The report is structured around the following research questions: 
 
1. What is the perceived utility of forensic analysis? How often is forensic 
evidence collected, how often is it analyzed, and when is it analyzed?  
2. What are the outcomes of forensic evidence testing? How often does 
forensic evidence testing yield useful information? 
3. What is the relationship between forensic evidence testing, arrest, and 
charging decisions? 
4. What is the relationship between forensic evidence testing and the plea-
bargaining process? 
5. What is the relationship between forensic evidence and conviction? 
6. Are concerns about forensic testing turnaround time warranted?   
7. What is the relationship between the institutional configuration of crime 
laboratories and their productivity?  
 To answer these questions we conducted four related empirical studies:  (1) In 
five widely varying jurisdictions, we analyzed data on a random sample of 1000 
reported crimes to measure the association between forensic evidence and 
criminal justice outcomes; (2) in those same jurisdictions, we interviewed police, 
forensic lab personnel, and prosecutors; (3) we conducted an experimental survey 
of prosecutors and defense counsel, and (4) we used the national census of crime 
labs to test hypotheses about crime laboratory institutional configuration. 
 
A.  Study Sites  
 
We collaborated with agencies in Sacramento County, CA, Sedgwick County, KS, 
Allegheny County, PA, Bexar County, TX, and King County, WA as our sites for 
data collection and interviews. These were desirable sites for several reasons: 1) 
the sites reflect some of the diversity found in institutional configurations of the 
crime labs in the criminal justice system; 2) two of the sites are jurisdictions which 
participate in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which 
                                                 
45 Peterson, supra note 23. 




facilitates collection detailed offense-level information for these jurisdictions; 3) 
the sites represent a range of law enforcement agencies in size and geographic 
diversity; 4) the jurisdictions have adopted a variety of policies to prioritize testing. 
This variation will assist us in better understanding the wide range of issues raised 
in the production, testing and use of forensic evidence.  
 Sacramento County, CA.  Sacramento County is one of three California 
counties whose crime laboratory is under the authority of the District Attorney’s 
Office.46 We recruited the Sacramento County District Attorney’s and its crime 
lab, along with the Sacramento Police Department, partly to see if any novel issues 
arise with respect to analysis and use of forensic evidence under this institutional 
crime laboratory arrangement.   
 Sedgwick County, KS.  The Sedgwick County Regional Forensic Science 
Center (SCRFSC) includes both the crime laboratory and the medical examiner’s 
office. Located in the county seat of Wichita, the SCRFSC receives the majority 
of its submissions from the Wichita Police Department. 
 Allegheny County, PA.  In Allegheny County the crime lab is housed within 
the Medical Examiner’s Office.  Its county seat, Pittsburgh, is the second-largest 
city in the state.  Both the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police and the Allegheny County 
District Attorney’s Office participated in the study. 
 King County, WA. Forensic analysis throughout the state of Washington is 
provided by a network of laboratories under the control of the Washington State 
Patrol, which is primarily responsible for policing the highways. Far from 
typifying the law enforcement crime laboratory institutional configuration, the 
situation in Washington is unusual because the law enforcement agency that 
oversees the laboratory rarely has need for its services. We enlisted the 
participation of the main laboratory in King County for interviews and case data, 
as well as the Seattle Police Department and the King County Prosecutor’s office.   
 Bexar County, TX.  The Bexar County Criminal Investigation Laboratory 
(BCCIL) is an independent, standalone laboratory. Approximately 60 percent of 
its work comes from San Antonio Police Department. BCCIL is unusual in that it 
has operated on a fee-for-service model since 1997.47  The method public sector 
crime labs typically use for prioritizing cases are submission policies, which 
restrict the types of cases the lab will consider and the number of samples/case.48  
 
Table 1 summarizes the population size, crime rates (incidence per 100,000 
residents) and police force strength for the five cities over the study period of 
2006-2009. 
                                                 
46 Santa Clara County and Solano County are the other two. The Orange County Crime Lab is, 
according to its website, “administered through a cooperative partnership of the Sheriff-Coroner, 
the District Attorney, and [the County CEO].”   
47 Personal communication, BCCIL Laboratory Director Tim Fallon 
48 In theory this system mitigates overuse of the crime lab because the users do not directly bear 
the costs of its utilization. The fee-for-service system shifts the costs to the submitting agencies 
on the principle that budget constraints will lead to more frugal use of crime lab services.  
Submission policies can be seen as a regulatory approach to controlling demand, while fee-for-
service is a market-based solution where the supply of services meets demand at cost. 





Table 1. Population, Police Force Strength, and Crime Rates (per 100K) for 






Homicide  Rape  Robbery Aggravated 
Assault 
Burglary 
Pittsburghc 312,349 868 0.18 0.39 4.83 5.11 10.52 
Sacramentod 458,283 801 0.10 0.40 4.13 6.02 11.97 
San Antonioe 1,334,750 1795 0.09 0.41 1.91 3.75 12.82 
Seattlef 598,771 1277 0.04 0.19 2.75 3.33 11.15 
Wichitag 363,878 646 0.08 0.72 1.43 6.73 11.18 
a U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts (https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/) 
b Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (2007). 
c Pittsburgh Police Department Annual Reports for 2007 (http://cprbpgh.org/966) and 2009 
(http://www.pittsburghpa.gov/police/files/annual_reports/09_Police_Annual_Report.pdf) 
d Sacramento Police Department annual reports (http://www.cityofsacramento.org/Police/About-
SPD/Annual-Report) 
e Texas Crime Reports 
(http://dps.texas.gov/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm) 
f Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs Crime Statistics Reports 
(http://www.waspc.org/crime-in-wa-archive-folder) 
g Kansas Bureau of Investigation Crime Statistics Reports 
(http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi/stats/stats_crime.shtml) 
 
B. Quantitative Analysis of Random Sample of Felony Cases  
1. Data Collection 
 
 To examine how forensic evidence is related to criminal justice outcomes, we 
obtained data on samples of homicide, sexual assault, aggravated assault, robbery, 
and burglary cases from each of the five study jurisdictions.49  In selecting our 
sampling frame, we sought to balance competing goals of looking at fairly recent 
crimes with the problem of right-censoring due to protracted investigation and 
adjudication phases often characteristic of serious felonies. 50  Ultimately, we 
opted to collect a random sample of 200 crimes of forcible rape, aggravated 
assault, robbery, and burglary, generated from each law enforcement agency’s 
comprehensive listing of reported crimes that occurred between 2007 and 2009. 
Because homicide is (fortunately) a less common event, we requested data on 
every recorded murder over the three-year period for all the sites except San 
Antonio, by far the most populous of the five jurisdictions in our study. In all five 
jurisdictions we added calendar year 2006 to increase the homicide sample size 
                                                 
49 We followed the Uniform Crime Reports classification system of making sure the crime in 
question was the most serious crime where more than one crime was committed in the incident.   
50 We also had to compromise between the desire for statistical power to test the impact of 
numerous variables with the labor required, both on our part and on the part of participating 
agencies, to assemble and code large data sets, sometimes from paper records. 




and the number of fully adjudicated cases, but were still shy of 1000 homicides 
total.  
 Three codebooks were distributed to guide law enforcement agencies, crime 
laboratories, and prosecutors’ offices in the collection of this data, along with 
corresponding spreadsheets listing the randomly selected case numbers as rows 
and the variable names as column headers. The Offense Codebook for law 
enforcement agencies was largely based on the National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) data dictionary in order to facilitate data collection 
for NIBRS-participating police departments (Seattle PD and Wichita PD). Not 
surprisingly, Records Management Systems for non-NIBRS agencies contained 
many of the same fields (e.g. offense date, arrest date, suspect and victim 
characteristics). In addition, the Offense Codebook also asked agencies whether 
and what types of forensic evidence were collected in the course of the 
investigation.  
 Crime laboratories received a Forensic Variable Codebook which began with 
two yes/no questions- whether any forensic evidence was submitted for analysis, 
and whether any forensic evidence was actually analyzed- followed by a series of 
items to detail what types of analysis were conducted and what results were 
obtained, as well as dates of analysis request, completion, and database 
outcomes.51 Finally, prosecutors were given a Judicial Outcomes Codebook to 
record, for those cases in which a suspect was arrested, how and when the cases 
progressed through the criminal courts.52   
 There are limitations in the information we were able to obtain from the study 
sites. For Allegheny County, we lack specific information on what types of 
evidence were collected by the police, apart from what can be inferred from those 
cases with submissions to the crime laboratory. For Sedgwick County, data on 
types of evidence is incomplete, with numerous items categorized only as 
“miscellaneous.”  Sacramento County and King County were unable to provide 
information on which cases were accompanied by witness reports. At all of the 
sites, fingerprint examinations were conducted by law enforcement agencies, but 
records were only accessible from Sacramento and King Counties.  Toxicology 
laboratories were similarly distinct from other crime laboratory functions, with 
their own management and case records, so we only received data on toxicology 
analyses from Allegheny, Sacramento, and Sedgwick County. Allegheny County 
crime lab was unable to provide data on which cases had DNA profiles uploaded 
to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database and whether any had 
yielded matches. Table 2 summarizes the differences in data across study 
jurisdictions. 
  
Table 2: Data availability by county 
 Allegheny Bexar King Sacramento Sedgwick 
                                                 
46We had hoped most of the crime lab case variables could be gleaned electronically from 
laboratory information management systems, but all five labs had to resort to paper records to 
complete our data request, increasing the time and expense of data collection. 
52 Codebooks are available upon request from the authors. 




Forensic Evidence Collected N Y Y Y Y 
Witness Reports Y Y N N N 
Fingerprint Comparison N N Y Y N 
Toxicology Analysis Y N N Y Y 
CODIS Entry/Result N Y Y Y Y 
 
 
 Table 3 below shows the distribution of the sample of crimes over crime types, 
for each of the five counties in the data. Including all homicides over a four-year 
span in the sample for each jurisdiction, the total was less than 200 in all but Bexar 
County. Sample sizes for some other offense categories were less than 200 
because of misclassification- other, typically less serious offenses erroneously 
made their way into the sample.53 
 
 
Table 3: Number of crimes by crime type and county 
 
 Sedgwick Bexar Sacramento Allegheny King Total 
Murder 138 201 163 197 91 790 
Rape 198 054 201 199 200 798 
Aggravated Assault 198 177 200 186 200 961 
Robbery 199 187 200 199 200 985 
Burglary 198 174 200 197 174 943 





 Our objective was to investigate whether and to what extent the collection and 
analysis of forensic evidence is related to criminal justice outcomes. An important 
consideration at the outset is defining the unit of analysis. Prior to arrest, the 
natural unit of analysis is the reported crime. However, once one or more arrests 
have been made, the term “case” may refer to the legal cases against one or more 
arrestees. This complicates the analysis since each crime may result in multiple 
                                                 
53Burglaries were the most error-prone offense category, at 13 percent. Given the already labor 
intensive data collection process, we opted not to ask participating law enforcement agencies to 
generate new random samples.   
54 In San Antonio we encountered a different problem with the case sample, which was 
inadvertently drawn from all manner of sexual assaults, not just forcible rape, with the result that 
very few cases in the random sample actually were forcible rapes. The forcible rape offense 
category was thus dropped from the San Antonio sample. 




legal cases which may lead to different outcomes for each arrestee. 55 In order to 
maintain a consistent sample definition throughout, we use the reported crime as 
our unit of analysis and refer to each as a case.56 
   
 We used regression analysis to identify the relationship of forensic analysis 
with outcomes ranging from arrest to conviction, while controlling for observable 
case characteristics. Although different types of evidence may be predictive of 
outcomes for different types of crime, 57  we conduct an analysis that pools 
different offenses for reasons of statistical power. 
 We are particularly interested in the relationship between forensic analysis 
and the probability that a case progresses from one stage to the next in the criminal 
justice system. For instance, a certain type of forensic testing may be useful in 
identifying suspects prior to arrest, but may have little bearing on outcomes later 
in the process, at which point other kinds of analysis may be more predictive of 
the outcome. We are therefore interested in modeling conditional probabilities, i.e. 
at each stage, we examine how the various types of forensic testing predict the 
outcome, conditional on the case having progressed to that stage.58  
 We should note that this methodology does not permit us to draw strong causal 
conclusions – we cannot say that forensic science is causally responsible for 
particular case outcomes.  In some cases, however, the correlations that we 
observe are suggestive of causal effects of forensic science. 
 
C.  Interviews 
 
 We conducted semi-structured interviews with detectives, prosecutors, and 
crime laboratory management working at participating agencies to gain insight 
                                                 
55 Confusingly, the term “case” can refer to both a reported crime (as it might be used by 
investigating detectives in referring to “unsolved case”) as well as a legal case against a specific 
defendant. 
56 In the relatively rare circumstance in which there is more than one arrestee for a crime, and 
therefore more than one judicial outcome, we collapse the multiple observations as follows: For 
charging, plea and trial decisions, and conviction, we consider each of these outcomes to have 
occurred if any of the arrestees experienced that outcome, e.g. a case is considered to have 
resulted in a conviction if any of the arrestees was convicted. When we look at the outcome of 
sentence length, we consider the maximum sentence length handed down to any of the 
defendants. 
57 See Peterson, supra n. 5 
58 Our analysis does not presume that progression of a particular case to trial and/or conviction is 
necessarily optimal or desirable–indeed, one may argue that the value of forensic evidence in 
exonerating innocent individuals is greater than its value in obtaining convictions. Because we 
collected information on the results of forensic analysis, we can, to an extent limited by the size 
of our sample, distinguish between the effects of exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, and 
thereby test whether forensic evidence is contributing to making the outcomes more “just”, as 
opposed to simply helping law enforcement agencies to prosecute individuals. 




into how forensic evidence is used.59  With the exception of one agency (one 
prosecutor’s office declined to participate), we interviewed at least five key 
respondents from each of the participating agencies (police department, 
prosecutor’s office, and crime laboratory) involved in the provision and use of 
analyzed forensic evidence at each of the five sites.  Each semi-structured 
interview lasted approximately one hour.   Interviews across agency type did 
address several common themes, including respondents’ perceptions of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the crime lab’s institutional setting; the 
prioritization of cases to determine if and when there might be conflict over 
limited laboratory resources; the extent of cooperation that occurs between the 
agencies; impediments to better cooperation; and overall satisfaction with the 
provision of forensic evidence analysis and the system for its delivery. To protect 
the confidentiality of participants, respondents are referred to by generic job title 
(i.e., detective, prosecutor, crime laboratory analyst or manager). 
 Separate interview instruments were devised for detectives, prosecutors, and 
forensic scientists. In general, detectives were asked about the use of forensic 
evidence in their investigations, including what determines whether a crime scene 
investigation is conducted, who collects evidence at crime scenes, and how 
forensic evidence has assisted or impeded investigations. Forensic scientists were 
asked questions about meeting evidence analysis demands and challenges to 
maintaining scientific objectivity within an adversarial system. Prosecutors were 
asked questions about the use of forensic evidence in the adjudication process, 
including whether forensic evidence was commonly tested before entering plea 
negotiations, how forensic evidence results influence plea bargaining negotiations, 
and jurors’ knowledge and expectations of forensic evidence.  
 We interviewed personnel with considerable relevant experience. Within the 
five police departments, we arranged to interview detectives and supervisors 
assigned to units that handled each of the five crimes of interest in this study: 
homicide, sexual assault, aggravated assault, burglary, and robbery. Within 
forensic laboratories, we sought out scientists and/or supervisors involved with 
analysis of different types of forensic evidence examined in this project including: 
DNA; firearms; trace; and narcotics. At county prosecutor offices, most of our 
interviews were with attorneys who had extensive experience handling serious 
felony cases.  
 
                                                 
59 We chose to conduct semi-structured interviews instead of structured interviews because the 
semi-structured format permitted open-ended questions and follow-up questions, allowing 
interview subjects to stray from the prepared list of topics.  This flexibility provided an 
opportunity for the participants to express insights that a more circumscribed interview format 
might miss.  
 
 




D.  Attorney Experimental Survey 
 
 The third part of the study involved an experimental study with practicing 
prosecutors and defense attorneys across the country.60  The goal of this portion 
of the study was to better understand the effects of forensic evidence on case 
outcomes related to attorney decision-making.  We presented attorneys with a 
hypothetical robbery case61 in which we manipulated whether the case featured 
individualizing forensic evidence (DNA evidence), and associative forensic 
evidence (glass fragments).62 Within the individualizing condition, we further 
manipulated whether the DNA testing resulted in a highly individualized finding 
in which there was a very low probability that another person contributed the 
sample, or a more ambiguous finding.63  After viewing the hypothetical case file, 
participating attorneys estimated their likelihood of offering or accepting a plea 
                                                 
60 Attorneys were recruited from a database of contact information for District Attorneys and 
Public Defenders that was compiled through on-line searches for practicing attorneys in 
approximately 25 states. This database includes attorneys practicing in a wide variety of 
geographical locations, jurisdictional sizes, etc. Attorneys were recruited to participate in the 
online study via email. The solicitation email provided a brief description of the study, an 
electronic link to the survey, and a random ID number for the attorneys to enter on the consent 
page of the study. Responses from 56 prosecuting attorneys and 55 defense attorneys are 
examined in the present analysis. The survey instrument is available upon request from the 
authors.  For a similar method, see Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert J. Morris, 
An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014). 
61 Attorneys were instructed to assume the role of prosecutor or defense attorney, depending on 
their positions. The case file contained a police form describing the victim’s statements 
concerning the robbery, information that the defendant had refused to be interviewed by the 
police, and information about a lineup that was conducted in which the victim identified the 
defendant in a photo lineup.  The file also included a description of the forensic evidence 
collected in the case and a report by the forensic lab describing the evidence analyzed and 
analysis results. 
62In the individualizing condition, the case file contained a description of blood evidence that 
was collected from a display case broken during the commission of the robbery.  The blood 
sample and a sample taken from the defendant were subsequently submitted for DNA testing. 
The DNA evidence was either ruled a complete match or a partial match in the forensic lab 
report. In the associative evidence condition, the file contained a description of glass that was 
collected from a display case broken during the commission of the robbery, and broken glass 
that was collected from the sleeve of the sweatshirt of the defendant upon his arrest. Glass 
collected from the crime scene and the defendant’s sweatshirt was submitted to the forensic lab 
for testing and in the forensic report was described as consistent.   
63Specifically, the study employed a 2 (Prosecution vs. Defense) x 3 (Forensic evidence type: 
Associative vs. Individualizing, Match vs. Individualizing, Partial March) factorial design.  The 
case file contained a police form describing the victim’s statements concerning the robbery, 
information that the defendant had refused to be interviewed by the police, and information 
about a lineup that was conducted in which the victim identified the defendant in a photo lineup.  
The file included a description of the forensic evidence collected in the case and a report by the 
forensic lab describing the evidence analyzed and analysis results.  In the police report and 
forensic lab report, we manipulated the type of forensic evidence collected and analysis results.  




bargain and the importance of the forensic evidence in their decision-making 
process.64  
 The hypothetical scenarios only manipulated factors related to forensic 
evidence, allowing us to isolate the effects of forensic evidence on attorneys’ 
decisions and lending insight into how the type and probative value of forensic 
evidence influence attorneys’ plea-bargaining decisions.  Because of our 
experimental methodology, we are able to draw strong causal conclusions about 
the effects of forensic science on the plea-bargaining process. 
  
E. Analysis of National Crime Lab Census Data 
 
 Finally, we performed an analysis using national data to investigate how 
structural and institutional factors might influence the efficiency of forensic 
laboratories. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ “Census of Publicly Funded Crime 
Laboratories” is a survey periodically administered to gather information about 
laboratory budget, staffing, output, and backlog.65  
 The Census of Forensic Labs was conducted in 2002, 2005 and 2009. The 
surveys elicited information from forensic labs across the country on 
organizational structure, jurisdiction served, types of services provided, and the 
number of requests received and completed in each category of forensic analysis. 
These categories are: (1) Firearms/Toolmarks, (2) Trace evidence, (3) Latent 
prints, (4) Controlled substances, (5) Toxicology, (6) Questioned documents, (7) 
Computer crimes, (8) Crime scene, (9) Biology screening, (10) DNA analysis, (11) 
Other services.66   
 Since our analysis focuses on violent offenses, we restricted attention to a 
smaller set of categories: Firearms/Toolmarks, Trace evidence, Latent prints, 
Crime scene, Biology screening and DNA analysis. The data record the number 
of requests for analysis that were processed by the lab during the calendar year. 
To convert this information to a rate, we divide it by the number of requests 
received during the year plus the number of backlogged requests as of the 
beginning of the year.   
                                                 
64 Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the case would go to trial. Prosecutors were 
asked about the likelihood they would offer a plea bargain of five, three, or one year in prison in 
exchange for a guilty plea in the case. Following each likelihood ratings, prosecutors were asked 
to provide reasons why they would or would not offer each plea deal.  Defense attorneys were 
provided with the same series of plea bargain offers.  For each offer, the defense attorney rated 
the likelihood that they would recommend that their client accept the offer and provide a reason 
for their recommendation.  Attorneys rated the strength of their case and the likelihood they 
would win the case if it were to go to trial on seven-point likert scales.   
65 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of Publicly Funded Forenisc Crime Laboratories (2009), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=244, last checked September 21, 
2015. 
66 The specificity of these categories improved over survey years. To construct a consistent 
dataset, we retained only the categories defined in the first year of the data, 2002. 




 About 93% of the counties represented in these data have only one crime lab. 
In all remaining cases, we average the data to measure lab clearance rates at the 
level of the county. We further restrict the sample to counties that appear in all 
three years of the data. 
 We use regression analysis to shed light on the determinants of lab clearance 
rates, relating the latter to factors such as the laboratory’s operating budget, the 
number of personnel, and its funding structure. 
 
IV.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 We structure our discussion of the results to follow our research questions. 
  
A. What is the perceived utility of forensic analysis? How often is forensic 
evidence collected, how often is it analyzed, and when is it analyzed?    
 
 From reports of long backlogs and overwhelmed crime laboratories, one might 
conclude that forensic evidence analysis is a feature of virtually every criminal 
investigation. The reality, at least for our study sites, was quite different. Table 4 




Table 4. Collection and Analysis of Forensic Evidence by Site and Offense 


























Sacramento 96.2±2.4 87.1±7.3 91.8±3.4 74.5±13.2 52.4 ±4.8 9.4±1.2 54.5±2.5 3.5±0.5 30.0±7.8 0.4±0.6 
San 
Antonio 
95.8±2.7 84.4±9.5 ----- ----- 43.5±16.1 10.7±3.3 15.0±5.8 0.5±0.9 4.6±1.5 0.6±0.9 
Seattle 89.6±4.5 17.1±13.8 60.1±4.0 8.7±3.3 17.4±6.3 0.9±0.9 13.4±0.6 0.7±1.3 18.5±4.3 1.2±1.2 
Wichita 80.4±6.7 65.9±6.3 81.9±9.1 30.2±4.0 80.7±5.8 6.0±2.1 51.0±7.9 3.3±2.3 37.9±11.6 1.1±1.0 
 
 
 Considerable variation is seen both across sites and across offense categories.  
First, the variation in the collection of evidence among sites is remarkable.  While 
forensic evidence was collected in 80 percent or more of murder cases 
investigated by all four police departments for which we had data, the remaining 
four offense categories exhibit significant disparities in the frequency of forensic 
evidence collection. Seattle PD collected forensic evidence in only about 60 
                                                 
67 No data was available on evidence collection from the Pittsburgh police. The rape offense 
category was excluded from San Antonio for this and all further analysis because of the problem 
with the sample containing mostly cases of child molestation and other forms of sexual assault.   




percent of forcible rape cases in the sample, whereas Sacramento PD collected 
forensic evidence in over 90 percent of its forcible rape cases.  
 Differences are observed in the rates at which collected evidence was analyzed 
as well.  The fraction of cases in which forensic evidence is analyzed in murders 
varies dramatically from a high of 87 percent for cases in Sacramento to a low of 
17 percent for cases in Seattle. These disparities attest to the degree of 
decentralization in our criminal justice system, as there appears to be little 
standardized practice, even in large jurisdictions in murder cases.  
 The use of forensic evidence in burglary and robbery cases is consistently low 
(despite research that suggests it can be effective).68  Analysis rates for robberies 
were less than five percent and analysis rates for burglaries were 2 percent or less 
at all sites, though we do not observe fingerprint analysis in San Antonio and 
Wichita. 69 
 These findings are consistent with statements of interviewees. Across 
jurisdictions, homicide detectives reported that forensic evidence was almost 
always collected at murder scenes or in the ensuing investigation. Detectives 
tasked with investigating aggravated assaults, robberies, or burglaries, however, 
acknowledged that many of their cases have no forensic evidence. Because sexual 
assaults are sometimes reported well after the crime commission, forensic 
evidence is sometimes not present in rape cases, either. Resource constraints are 
also a factor, with homicides receiving the lion’s share of investigative resources. 
Because of the relative rarity and severity of murder, homicide detectives, with 
few exceptions begin investigating cases at the crime scene.  Other crimes against 
persons, however, are typically assigned to detectives by a supervisor the next day 
(or the following Monday for weekend incidents). Usually the scene is processed 
by patrol officers, in consultation with the patrol sergeant at the station, who has 
to be budget conscious and may not have investigational experience. When asked 
how he usually becomes involved in a case, a detective assigned to crimes against 
persons answered: 
 
It really depends on how serious it is. On the really serious stuff you’re 
going to be made aware of it in daily summaries, but if it’s a garden-variety 
street robbery with no injuries it might be 2-3 days before it’s assigned. It 
depends also on the number of cases in the queue and peoples’ schedules. 
We still do have on-call…I used to get called out a lot more frequently. 
They’ve really changed it for our unit, to save money. 
 
 Although burglary detectives indicated that forensic evidence was 
infrequently used, several recalled cases in which key forensic evidence was left 
behind at the scene, for example cigarette butts in houses where no one smoked, 
                                                 
68 Roman, supra note. 
69 Relative to the other three departments, the drop off in forensic evidence collection for 
robberies and burglaries is less steep in Wichita, but forensic evidence collection was broadly 
defined in Wichita. 




or blood around a broken window at the point of entry. One burglary detective 
voiced a desire to see more time and resources devoted to processing burglary 
crime scenes, particularly given the high rate of repeat burglary offenders.   
 Detective responses were also consistent with observed patterns for 
submitting collected evidence to the crime lab. Homicide detectives reported 
routinely requesting evidence examinations and tests from the crime lab. 
Detectives in sexual assault units generally described crime lab use as somewhat 
less frequent, pointing out that even when forensic evidence is present, it may be 
of limited value if consent rather than identity is at issue. Robbery and burglary 
detectives varied between jurisdictions and in some cases reported using the lab 
as few as 3 or 4 times per year. 
 When asked about the importance of forensic evidence in their pre-arrest 
investigations, the most frequently mentioned benefits were: (1) confirming 
suspicions and bolstering probable cause for arrest; (2) ruling out scenarios or 
suspects so investigations can proceed more efficiently; (3) using potential 
forensic evidence as leverage for obtaining confessions, even if the evidence has 
not been analyzed at the time of interrogation, or even if no such evidence actually 
exists; (4) reviving a cold case by providing, through a database match, the name 
of a putative perpetrator or  link to another  unsolved crime, and; (5) increasing 
the likelihood the case will eventually be adjudicated through plea agreement, 
thus reducing the amount of time detectives spend in court. DNA, firearms, and 
fingerprints were mentioned most often by detectives as being key pieces of 
forensic evidence. 
 Some detectives, particularly those investigating property crimes or crimes in 
which the suspect’s identity is typically not in doubt, saw less utility in forensic 
evidence. These detectives stressed that forensics is just one piece of the puzzle. 
As one crime investigator remarked, “It is not possible to go to court with only 
forensic evidence.” Several detectives made it clear they do not do anything 
differently when they have forensic evidence. Rather, they “work the case”, 
interviewing witnesses, checking alibis, and following leads regardless of whether 
crime laboratory analysis of evidence has anything to contribute.   
 The fact that available forensic evidence did not affect the detectives’ 
approaches to the case suggests that changing the practice of police may be 
necessary to fully realize the potential of forensic evidence. 
 Finally some detectives recalled cases in which forensic evidence testing 
complicated or contradicted their theory of the crime. They felt that it forced them 
to re-examine their thinking or prevented them from continuing to pursue the 
wrong suspect. As one Sacramento PD detective put it, “You can get stuck trying 
to make the crime fit your scenario. We had a murder suspect with blood on his 
shoes who lived in the same apartment complex as the victim. We held him on 
some outstanding warrants until the lab did the analysis and told us it didn’t match 
our victim. We went back to the drawing board and ended up with a set of facts 
that made more sense.”70   
                                                 
70 Another investigator noted that “[Forensic evidence] helps you keep an open mind as an 
investigator. You can get stuck trying to make the crime fit your scenario.” 




  Some investigators we interviewed may have expressed less enthusiasm for 
the utility of forensic evidence because in their experience it is usually not 
helpful until after an arrest has been made. 
We use information on forensic analysis dates to understand the utilization 
of forensic analysis at each stage of the criminal justice process. Table 5 shows 
the fraction of cases in our overall sample for which at least one forensic 
analysis was requested and/or completed prior to the outcomes of arrest, plea 
bargain and trial, for each of these categories: (i) Trace evidence (this includes 
hairs, fibers, glass and paint testing), (ii) Drug analysis, (iii) DNA evidence 
(including STR and Y-STR testing), (iv) Firearms evidence (including test firing 
weapons, comparison scope examinations of bullet striations and cartridge case 
firing pin impressions to determine if a particular gun was used in a crime, and 
Scanning Electron Microscopy with Energy-Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy 
(SEM/EDX) to identify gunshot residue on hands or clothing, etc., (v) CODIS 
(DNA database entry), (vi) NIBIN (firearm toolmark database entry).   For each 
outcome, the sample is restricted to cases in which the outcome (i.e. arrest, plea, 
or trial) actually occurred. Thus, these figures represent the fraction of arrests, 
pleas and trials that are preceded by requests for and completion of forensic 
analysis. A third column lists the fraction of cases in which the completed 
analysis yields a probative result. 
 
Table 5. Rates of arrest, plea and trial outcomes that were preceded by 
request for and completion of forensic analysis 
 Prior to arrest (N=1139) Prior to plea bargain (N=470) Prior to trial (N=357) 
 Ra Ca Pa R C P R C P 
Trace 
analysis 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.9% 0.0% 3.9% 2.0% 0.0% 
Drug 
analysis 1.0% 0.4% ND 1.3% 0.9% ND 1.4% 0.8% ND 
DNA 
analysis 3.5% 2.5% 1.7% 7.0% 6.8% 6.0% 22.4% 21.8% 19.9% 
Firearms 
/toolmark 
analysis 3.9% 3.2% 2.5% 9.1% 8.1% 4.2% 24.6% 23.2% 16.0% 
CODIS 
search 2.2% 2.2% 1.4% 6.6% 6.6% 3.4% 10.6% 10.6% 1.7% 
NIBIN            
searchb 3.2% 3.2% 0.4%  6.2% 6.2%  1.1% 16.8% 16.8% 2.5%  
a  R= Requested, C= Completed, P= Probative 
b The National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), overseen by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, is a database of digital images of spent cartridges 
casings and bullets from crime scenes or test-fired from guns confiscated by law enforcement.  
 
 Rates of both request and completion are generally low.  The requests and 
completion increase slowly as we move from arrest to plea (in fact, the absolute 
number of cases with completed analysis barely changes from pre-arrest to pre-
plea), with a sharp increase at the pre-trial stage.  This suggests either that the 




prospect of trial spurs further forensic analysis or that the cases that go to trial 
have significantly more forensic evidence and/or analysis to start with than cases 
that plead out. In any event, these rates are strikingly low throughout, and 
especially so at the arrest stage.71 
 Trace and drug analysis often cannot occur prior to an arrest. Hairs, fibers, 
paint transfers, require an exemplar from a suspect’s person, vehicle, or house in 
order to have probative value, and such searches normally take place pursuant to 
probable cause for arrest. Our study didn’t collect data on positive drug 
identification because of its ambiguous relevance to non-drug offenses.    
 By contrast, DNA and firearms/toolmarks analysis account for the majority of 
forensic analyses requested, and corresponding CODIS and NIBIN searches are 
carried out at relatively high rates of completion and probity, indicating their value 
not only to prosecutors but to detectives with no viable suspects. 
 Table 5 also sheds some light on the timeliness of forensic analysis. The 
availability of analysis appears to be reasonably responsive in the case of DNA 
and firearms analysis, as attested by the fact that rates of prior completion are 
close to rates of request, but this not true for drug and trace analysis.  
B. How often does forensic evidence testing yield useful information?  
 Testing of forensic evidence does not always add value. For example, the 
DNA profile from a cigarette butt on the curb of a busy street where a robbery 
getaway car was parked, if it excludes the suspect, may be unrelated to the crime 
– or it may belong to the actual perpetrator.  Still, to get a sense of how useful 
forensic analysis is, we analyzed how often forensic analysis results were 
inconclusive or conclusive (either in the direction of inclusion or exclusion).  We 
looked at each of the broad categories of evidence used in Table 5, as well as for 
fingerprint evidence by crime type.72  
 Table 6 below summarizes the rates of forensic analysis on the basis of these 
categories, for each of the offense types in our data. These rates are unconditional, 
i.e. for each type of analysis we do not condition on whether or not evidence that 
could be used for such an analysis was collected. 
 
Table 6: Rates of Occurrence and Outcome of Forensic Analyses by Crime 
Type (percentage) 
 Murder Rape 
Aggravated 
Assault Robbery Burglary Total 
Trace evidence       
Analyzed 3.4 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.7 
Inconclusive 0.9   0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0   0.2 
Inclusion   1.1   0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0   0.2 
Exclusion 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
                                                 
71 Peterson et al., also note that arrest of a suspect often precedes forensic analysis. 
72 Given the size of the sample, it was not feasible to estimate the effect of every single type of 
forensic analysis. 




Drug evidence       
Analyzed 3.4 23.2 0.9 0.6 0.6 8.7 
DNA evidence       
Analyzed 19.6 10.8   1.3   1.8  .7 6.4 
Inconclusive   3.4   2.3     0.0     0.1     0.1   1.1 
Weak inclusion 1.4     0.4 0.2    0.1       0.0   0.4 
Strong 
inclusion73   12.4 6.8       1.0 1.6       0.5   4.2 
Exclusion 2.4   1.4     0.1 0.0       0.1   0.8 
Firearms 
evidence       
Analyzed 27.3 6.5 7.5   2.4   1.1 8.5 
Inconclusive   5.8   0.6     0.1     1.0     0.3   2.0 
Inclusion 18.2   5.5     0.7     0.4     0.7   5.6 
Exclusion 3.3   0.4     0.6     0.9     0.1   0.9 
CODIS database 
entry       
Uploaded 12.3 7.5  0.8  1.2 0.3 3.9 
No match   8.8   4.2     0.8     0.4     0.0  2.5 
Inclusion   3.5   3.3     0.0     0.8     0.1   1.4 
NIBIN database 
entry       
Uploaded 18.9 5.0   6.6   1.1   0.6 6.2 
No match 14.8   3.8     5.2     0.9   0.6   5.0 
Inclusion   4.1   1.2     1.4     0.2   0.0   1.3 
Fingerprints 
evidence       
Analyzed 17.4 11.3   4.3   10.0 28.6 17.4 
No match   12.9   9.5     3.8     9.0 23.5   12.9  
Inclusion   4.5   1.8     1.5     1.0  5.1  4.5 
Note: The figures in the table refer to the percentage of cases in which each type of analysis 
was performed or outcome was obtained. In the case of forensic testing outcomes (i.e. 
inclusion, exclusion, etc.) the percentages are unconditional, i.e. not conditional on whether 
forensic evidence was analyzed. In a number of cases, multiple pieces of evidence were 
submitted for analysis. For each such case, we regard the outcome of analysis to be 
inclusive (for example), if the analysis of any of the pieces of evidence proved inclusion. 
Thus, the outcome of exclusion is applied only to cases that had no result other than 
exclusions. It is therefore not a reliable indicator of rate of suspect exoneration. 
 
 Several aspects of Table 6 are notable.  First, as already suggested by Table 5, 
we note a very low rate of trace evidence analysis- performed in just a fraction of 
a percent of the cases in our sample- relative to drug, DNA, firearms, and 
                                                 
73 Strong inclusions refer to biological evidence determined to originate from a single source and 
matching a suspect or the victim to the exclusion of virtually everyone else, as opposed to weak 
inclusions consisting of DNA mixtures or partial DNA profiles. 




fingerprint evidence analysis. None of the categories of forensic analysis is 
routine, with the arguable exception of fingerprints. Forensic evidence analysis is 
a less common feature of non-lethal, non-sexual offenses (again with the 
exception of fingerprints). These findings are consistent with our interviews with 
detectives about the utility of forensic evidence analysis: associative evidence 
(often produced by trace evidence analysis) is useful to an investigation less often 
than individualizing forensic evidence, and forensic evidence analysis on the 
whole is usually not part of aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary 
investigations. 
 Across offense categories, DNA tests resulted in more inclusions than 
exclusions. Where firearms evidence is analyzed, it also implicates a suspect more 
often than not. This observation is also in line with detective accounts of the utility 
of these analyses to their investigations. Recognize, however, that the exclusion 
rate shown may be far lower than the total exclusion rate, as only cases with no 
inclusions are counted in this table. Finally, crime laboratories appear to be 
diligently uploading CODIS and NIBIN, as the fraction of cases uploaded tracks 
closely with the fraction of cases with probative results.74  
C. Estimating the strength of the relationship between forensic evidence 
testing and case disposition 
 
 In Table 6 we saw the results of the forensic analyses performed and the very 
small fraction of cases in which the analyses were performed prior to arrest.    But 
how much difference do these tests make to the resolution of the case? To answer 
this question, we estimate linear probability models of the following form: 
                  𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝒁𝒊𝒋𝒕 + 𝜂 + 𝜂 + 𝜀                        (1) 
  
Where 𝑦  is an indicator for whether a particular binary outcome (e.g. arrest, 
decision to file charges, conviction)  was made in case i occurring in county j in 
year t; 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕  is a vector of indicator variables representing each of the forensic 
testing categories; 𝒁𝒊𝒋𝒕  is a vector of victim characteristics including victim 
gender and ethnicity – it may also include arrestee characteristics for post-arrest 
outcomes; 𝜂  and 𝜂  are county and year fixed effects respectively, and is an error 
term. Our interest centers on the 𝜷 vector of coefficients, which captures the effect 
of forensic testing on the outcome of interest.  
 As explained earlier, our interest is in modeling conditional probabilities, i.e. 
the regression equation above is estimated at each stage of the process while 
restricting the sample to cases that have progressed to that stage. Selection bias is 
a natural concern in this context-- as a case progresses from arrest to sentencing, 
the sample shrinks in a non-random way. Thus, for example, the sample of cases 
that reach the stage where charges are filed is a selected sub-sample of the set of 
cases that were referred to the DA, which in turn are a selected sample of the cases 
                                                 
74 Bear in mind some DNA inclusions are bound to be victim profiles, which are not to be 
entered into CODIS. 




in which an arrest was made. This non-random selection tends to bias our estimate 
of the effect of forensic analysis on the probability that a case progresses from one 
stage to the next. Some researchers attempt to correct for sample selection bias 
using Heckman’s sample selection correction. Unfortunately, this procedure 
works poorly unless one can identify credible exclusion restrictions, i.e. variables 
that enter the selection equation but not the final equation of interest in order to 
isolate the selection effect.75 Because we found no plausible exclusion restrictions, 
we chose not to use the Heckman correction. The reader is therefore warned to 
exercise caution in interpreting the estimated effects. 
A second threat to causal identification arises from omitted variables. For 
example, certain unobserved aspects of a crime may influence law enforcement 
agencies’ commitment to solving the case;76 if so, these unobserved factors would 
likely influence the outcomes of interest as well as the decision to collect and 
analyze forensic evidence. This would tend to bias estimates of a causal effect of 
forensic evidence collection and analysis on case outcomes. To mitigate this 
problem, we include a number of controls in our regressions, including victim and 
arrest characteristics, as well as jurisdiction fixed effects.  
 Similarly, there may be interdependence between the decision to test 
evidence and the decision to arrest/charge/etc. The chronology of events is key: 
As we saw in Table 5, for many crimes in our sample, forensic testing occurs after 
a particular outcome of interest has occurred (e.g. arrest), and therefore cannot 
logically have contributed to this outcome.  There may however be a strong 
association between the particular outcome and forensic testing, reflecting reverse 
causation. For example, once charges have been brought, law enforcement 
agencies may become more likely to submit evidence for testing. This problem is 
most pronounced when we are looking at outcomes in the early stages of a case, 
but becomes less severe in later stages (e.g. conviction and sentencing) because 
                                                 
75  See generally Shawn Bushway, Brian D. Johnson & Lee Ann Slocum, Is the Magic Still 
There?  The Use of the Heckman Two-Step Correction for Selection Bias in Criminology, 23 J. 
QUANT. CRIMINOL. 151 (2007) (critically reviewing literature and criticizing widespread 
inappropriate use of Heckman method).   
76 Only a little imagination is required to see how unobserved crime characteristics can affect 
forensic evidence collection, subsequent analysis, and even the results of analysis. First, in some 
scenarios there may not be any forensic evidence to collect. For example, if a man is robbed at 
gunpoint on a street corner, the encounter is unlikely to produce any forensic evidence. Forensic 
evidence may also be dispersed or destroyed by a conscientious perpetrator, the elements (rain, 
wind, animals), or a distraught victim. Forensic evidence may go uncollected because it is 
overlooked or deemed unnecessary (e.g. casts of suspect footwear impressions for a crime 
witnessed by dozens of people). Conversely, evidence may be collected and analyzed to guard 
against accusations of negligence, particularly in high-profile cases, even when it is highly 
unlikely to contribute useful information (e.g. sampling and testing a pool of blood under the 
victim of a stabbing to confirm the blood originated from them). Our supposition is that a 
majority of forensic evidence collection and analysis occurs because detectives and prosecutors 
are confident about its probative value. The anticipated value of the evidence is a function of 
their experience and details they gather in the course of their investigations, including an 
assessment of the importance and likelihood of bringing the perpetrator(s) to justice, most of 
which we do not observe. 




these later outcomes almost always occur after any forensic testing. In the next 
section, we explain how we attempt to mitigate reverse causality when looking at 
early outcomes.    
D. What is the relationship between forensic evidence testing, arrest, and 
charging decisions? 
 Our qualitative interviews, along with the statistics on pre-arrest forensic 
testing, together suggest that forensic testing may not play an important role in 
the decision to make an arrest, especially when other evidence is available. 
However, there may also be instances in which forensic testing may be required 
to identify putative suspects in the first place. In this context, some types of 
forensic evidence may be more valuable than others.  
 We allow the data to speak on this matter, by examining the effect of forensic 
testing on arrest and charging decisions. A key concern is that the majority of 
forensic testing occurs after arrest (and after charges have been filed). It is 
therefore critical to account for the chronology of testing vis-à-vis arrest if we are 
to avoid picking up the effects of arrest on subsequent decisions to test forensic 
evidence, rather than the other way around. Our unusually comprehensive data 
collection effort is geared toward addressing this challenge: For each category of 
forensic analysis, we consider testing to have been done if the result was known 
prior to arrest, i.e. we define an indicator for forensic testing (for each category of 
analysis) that takes the value 1 for a particular case if the results were known prior 
to arrest. It is important to note that this definition also includes cases in which 
there was no arrest.  
 We estimate the regression equation, separately for arrest and charging 
decisions as the outcome variables of interest. In the case of charging, we 
condition the sample on cases in which an arrest was made. Table 7 presents the 
results of these regressions. 
 
Table 7: Association of forensic testing with arrest and charging decisions  




      
Trace evidence analyzed -0.018  
 (0.498)  
Drug analysis -0.043 0.060 
 (0.100) (0.189) 
DNA analysis -0.044 0.046 
 (0.049) (0.096) 
Firearms/toolmarks analysis -0.052 0.158** 
 (0.044) (0.070) 
CODIS hit obtained 0.199** -0.061 
 (0.099) (0.174) 
NIBIN hit obtained -0.015 -0.076 
 (0.152) (0.172) 




   
Observations 2,721 647 
Means of dependent variables 0.362 0.640 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for jurisdiction fixed 
effects, offense fixed effects and binary indicators for whether any of the victims was female, 
and whether any of the victims was white. The regression in Column 2 also controls for arrestee 
gender and race.  
  
Statistical power is clearly an issue here, with many of the coefficients lacking 
precision. In the case of arrest (Column 1), With the exception of the coefficient 
on CODIS result (which is significant at 5% level), which does suggest a strong 
positive correlation with the probability of arrest (the point estimate implies 
obtaining a CODIS hit results in a 19 percentage point increase in the probability 
of arrest), none of the coefficients on the forensic testing indicators is statistically 
significant, and many of them have the wrong sign. The results in Column 2 are, 
although even here precision is clearly lacking. With regard to the charging 
decision, firearms/toolmarks analysis is associated with a 15.8 percentage point 
increase in the probability of charges being filed (conditional on arrest having 
been made), although precision is clearly lacking. Note that in Column 2, we are 
not able to estimate a coefficient on trace analysis due to insufficient variation in 
the sample.  
 These results are consonant with the observation (see Tables 5 and 6) that 
DNA and firearms analysis are the two categories of forensic analyses that are 
most commonly requested by law enforcement.  The results also largely comport 
with what we heard from prosecutors, most of whom said that charges are usually 
filed before forensic evidence has been analyzed (estimates ranged from 75 to 90 
percent of the time), adding that most cases their office handles are strong enough 
to warrant filing of charges without forensic testing results in hand. Two 
Sedgwick County prosecutors said the agency made every effort to get forensic 
testing done ahead of filing to reduce the risk of charging innocent people. 
Prosecutors pointed out that often when analysis precedes filing, it precedes arrest 
also, as with forensic database “cold hits.”  
 We did observe an increase in the probability of charges being filed in rape 
cases when trace evidence is tested. Aggravated assault arrestees are apparently 
more likely to be charged in cases in which firearms evidence and fingerprints are 
tested; this may be a proxy for the weapon having been recovered, which would 
be important for establishing the aggravated circumstances of the assault. 
Similarly, a charge of robbery is more supportable with DNA evidence to show 
that force and/or weaponry were involved.    
E.  How does forensic evidence affect the plea-bargaining process? 
 Once charges have been filed, multiple outcomes become possible. This stage 
entails not just the decision to plead or go to trial, but also the options of dismissal 
and diversion, and sometimes between trial by judge or jury. This phase also 
involves decisions that are made jointly by prosecutors and the defense (i.e. 




whether to offer and/or accept a plea versus accepting the greater risk of a bench 
or jury trial).77  
 Theoretically, forensic evidence could make plea bargains either more likely 
or less likely.  Strong forensic evidence against a defendant could make the 
defense less eager to go to trial, but might also make the prosecution less likely to 
offer a plea agreement with terms a defendant is willing to accept.  So the 
relationship between forensic evidence and plea agreement rates is an interesting 
empirical question.  
 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, defendants in the nation’s 75 
largest counties charged with the five Part I offenses examined in our study were 
adjudicated through plea agreements at the rate of 51 percent for murder, 60 
percent for rape, 52 percent for aggravated assault, 64 percent for robbery, and 67 
percent for burglary.78 Plea agreement rates for the study sites are shown in Table 
8 below. In our sample, homicide plea agreement rates are several points lower, 
and aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary plea agreement are markedly higher. 
The difference may be due to our sample covering a three or four-year period, 
rather than a single year, 2009, examined by Bureau of Justice Statistics or simply 
a function of the particular jurisdictions in our study.79  
 
Table 8: Adjudication of Charged Defendants in Sample  
 Dismissed Diverted Plea Jury Trial Bench Trial 
Homicide 3.0 0.5 45.5 47.7 1.4 
Rape 4.3 0.9 59.1 25.2 0.9 
Aggravated 
Assault 10.9 0.0 72.8 6.8 0.0 
Robbery 15.1 2.6 71.1 10.8 0.4 
Burglary 5.5 0.0 78.1 5.5 0.0 
 
   
 We examine the relationship between forensic evidence and the outcome 
obtained in this stage by looking at how the former correlates with each of the 
possible outcomes, using the linear probability regression specification as before. 
Because diversions and bench trials account for a small fraction of outcomes in 
our sample, we group the outcomes into the following three categories: (1) 
                                                 
77 For the prosecution, a plea agreement is an expedient way to obtain convictions, the outcome 
by which their performance, and that of their elected bosses, is often evaluated. Defense 
attorneys will consider whether the odds and stakes of conviction at trial for the charged 
offense(s) are such that pleading guilty to a lesser offense is the more prudent option to 
recommend to their client. Judges may also encourage plea agreements to reduce the backlog of 
pending trials on their calendars. 
78Reaves, Brian (2013). Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009- Statistical Tables, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., p. 24. About one third of felony defendants either 
have the charges dismissed (25 percent) or are adjudicated through pretrial diversion/deferred 
prosecution (9 percent). Of the remaining two-thirds of felony defendants, about 96 percent are 
adjudicated through plea agreements. 
79 One of the study jurisdictions, Sedgwick County, is not among the 75 largest counties in the 
United States.. 




dismissal or diversion, (2) plea bargain, (3) bench or jury trial. The regression 
samples only include cases in which charges were filed.  
 Because we do not know precisely when this stage of the process was resolved, 
we cannot be sure which pieces of forensic evidence were available to inform the 
decision. As we saw in Table 5, this is an important issue, given that rates of 
forensic testing prior to plea are still relatively low compared to the same rates at 
the time of trial. We opt to err on the side of caution, by restricting attention as 
before to testing that was conducted prior to arrest.  
Table 9 below presents the results of the estimation. 
 
Table 9: Association of forensic testing with post-charging outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Dismissal/Diversio
n Plea Trial 
        
Trace evidence analyzed    
    
Drug analysis 0.011 -0.160 -0.033 
 (0.017) (0.265) (0.252) 
DNA analysis -0.007 -0.140 0.255** 
 (0.012) (0.129) (0.113) 
Firearms/toolmarks analysis -0.027** -0.085 0.119 
 (0.013) (0.085) (0.084) 
CODIS hit obtained -0.002 0.171 -0.330 
 (0.027) (0.230) (0.233) 
NIBIN hit obtained 0.282 0.150 -0.431 
 (0.279) (0.290) (0.299) 
    
Observations 414 414 414 
R-squared 0.119 0.200 0.233 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for jurisdiction fixed 
effects, offense fixed effect, race and gender of the victim as well as the arrestee. 
As in the pre-arrest stage, both DNA analysis and firearms analysis appear to be 
important predictors of the outcome in the post-charging stage. The pattern of 
coefficients across the three outcomes indicates that when DNA and/or firearms 
analysis occur, the case is more likely to proceed to trial than to be pled out or 
dismissed. Interestingly, NIBIN and CODIS hits are associated with a decreased 
probability of trial relative to plea bargain, although these coefficients are not as 
well estimated.  
 Whether each of these types of forensic testing confers an advantage on the 
prosecution or the defense is difficult to infer from these results, given that we are 
merely identifying the average change in probability for all forensic testing (rather 




than the effects of the various outcomes of the test, i.e. exonerating, implicating 
or inconclusive).80 
   
 To assess the effect of our restriction to pre-arrest forensic testing, we also 
present results from a set of estimations in which testing is considered to have 
occurred if it occurred at all at any point in the justice process. The results are in 
Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10: Association of forensic testing with post-charging outcomes 
(including all testing) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dismissal/Diversion Plea Trial 
        
Trace evidence analysed -0.062** 0.124 -0.015 
 (0.030) (0.145) (0.146) 
Drug analysis 0.023 -0.160** 0.132** 
 (0.022) (0.066) (0.059) 
DNA analysis -0.012 -0.238*** 0.286*** 
 (0.013) (0.073) (0.076) 
Firearms/toolmarks analysis 0.014 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.035) (0.068) (0.066) 
CODIS hit obtained 0.001 0.268*** -0.257*** 
 (0.031) (0.092) (0.094) 
NIBIN hit obtained 0.020 -0.065 0.048 
 (0.042) (0.080) (0.076) 
    
Observations 737 737 737 
R-squared 0.115 0.127 0.215 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for jurisdiction fixed 
effects and binary indicators for whether any of the victims was female, and whether any of the 
                                                 
80 We are unable to shed further light on this question because even though we have information 
on the outcomes of the various forensic analyses, the data are not detailed enough for us to 
discern which of the various samples of evidence in a particular evidence category is associated 
with which particular testing result, implying that we do not know at which point in time each of 
the probative results was obtained relative to the outcomes we are studying. However, this 
timing issue can largely be ignored when we look at conviction and sentencing outcomes. 
 There are some statistical implications of our decision to restrict attention to testing that 
occurred before arrest. First, doing so has the disadvantage of sacrificing power (given that rates 
of testing prior to arrest are low). To the extent that we are ignoring some forensic analysis that 
occurred after arrest but before the dismissal/plea/trial decision was made, we will also 
effectively run the risk of understating the strength of the correlation. To see this point, suppose, 
to start with, that DNA analysis (for example) increases the probability of trial. To estimate this 
effect, we will be comparing cases that had DNA analysis prior to arrest to those that did not. 
But what if the latter set of cases in fact had (unknown to us) DNA analysis done immediately 
after the arrest? In that event, we would observe very little difference in trial rates across the two 
groups, and would incorrectly conclude that DNA analysis has no effect at this stage of the 
process. Nonetheless, our prior is that the biases due to reverse causation are significant enough 
to warrant this restrictive definition of the testing variables. 




victims was white, as well as binary indicators for whether any of the arrestees was female and 
whether any of the arrestees was white. 
  
We notice that while the effect of DNA analysis continues to be qualitatively 
similar in sign, magnitude and statistical significance, firearms/toolmarks analysis, 
drug analysis and NIBIN hits actually reverse their signs, suggesting conclusions 
opposite to those in Table 9. These results highlight the importance of accounting 
carefully for event chronology. 
  Responses from our qualitative interviews underscore the complexity of the 
relationship between forensic evidence and the disposition of cases once charges 
have been filed. Several prosecutors indicated that forensic evidence was 
routinely sent for testing before plea negotiations. A deputy district attorney in 
Allegheny County who handled homicide cases stated that forensic evidence is 
almost always tested ahead of plea bargaining because he and his colleagues want 
to know exactly what they have on the table when negotiations begin. But in other 
jurisdictions, homicide prosecutors said they didn’t engage in plea bargaining for 
homicides, so it didn’t really matter whether they had forensic test results at that 
stage. Most assistant district attorneys reported less consistency in having forensic 
evidence analyzed prior to plea bargaining negotiations. Some prosecutors 
reported that they generally tried to have forensic evidence tested, but that it was 
sometimes not possible because of the crime laboratory’s backlog, especially for 
less serious cases (i.e. robberies and burglaries in which victims were unharmed). 
Others reported that sometimes they didn’t need forensic evidence test results to 
have “a good feel” for the case. Several prosecutors in sexual assault units 
reported that testing requests depended on the case, for example whether the 
defendant was claiming consent or not.81   
 Prosecutors said they would sometimes delay negotiations until they had 
received forensic results. Some reported they would delay plea-bargaining if the 
forensic evidence results could potentially strengthen their case. They explained 
that the sort of plea bargain offered depends in part on their confidence in winning 
at trial, which in turn is affected by the probative value of the forensic evidence 
to the state’s case.  
 By the same logic, a few of the prosecutors we interviewed indicated they 
might be inclined to wait for DNA evidence results in particular before beginning 
negotiations if there were obvious weaknesses in their case, like witness 
credibility issues. One respondent stated that DNA evidence was more important 
than other traditionally strong pieces of evidence, such as a defendant’s 
confession.  Another stated that if he has one witness and forensic evidence, he is 
more likely to go to trial (so the stronger the case, the less likely they are to plead 
out).   
 There were differences of opinion, however, over how the presence of forensic 
evidence affected case disposition, as other prosecutors indicated that the presence 
                                                 
81 If the defendant admitted to sexual relations with the victim, then the probative value of DNA 
evidence is limited to confirming this fact. 




of inculpatory forensic evidence increased rather than decreased the likelihood of 
a plea. Said one, “If we have DNA evidence, then we have the upper hand, and 
don’t have to give away the farm to get the case resolved during negotiations.” 
Several respondents indicated that DNA evidence made them more comfortable 
about resolving the case, and one acknowledged that when DNA results 
implicated the perpetrator in a mixture with an unknown third party, it increased 
his willingness to offer a plea.   
 Others described the effect of forensic evidence on plea bargain likelihood as 
highly circumstance-dependent.  For example, the probative value of forensic 
evidence was often limited in self-defense cases, mental defense cases, or a sexual 
assault case in which consent is the issue. In contrast, forensic evidence is an 
important factor when the identity of the perpetrator is at issue.  More than one 
prosecutor opined that forensic evidence was no more or less important than other 
factors, such as eyewitness accounts and other circumstantial evidence.     
 Our experimental survey allowed us to empirically test the prosecutors’ 
statements on the effect of forensic evidence on plea-bargaining. As explained in 
Section II Part D, we created a hypothetical criminal case and varied the type of 
forensic evidence available in the hypothetical.  Criminal defense attorneys and 
prosecutors either viewed a hypothetical robbery case featuring DNA evidence 
against the defendant, or a case containing associative forensic evidence (glass 
fragments) against the defendant. Attorneys who viewed the case with DNA 
evidence received further information -- either that testing indicated there was a 
very low probability that another person contributed the sample, or that testing 
revealed a more ambiguous finding.  All other features of the robbery case were 
identical between conditions.  We then asked attorneys to indicate the likelihood, 
from 0 to 10, that they would offer/accept each of the potential plea bargains – 
five years, three years, and one year in prison in exchange for a guilty plea.  
 











      
Five-year plea  
5.53 (SD = 
4.17) 
6.33 (SD = 
2.91) 
7.10 (SD =  
3.28)  
    
Three-year plea 
3.38 (SD = 
2.45) 4.24 (2.82) 
5.35 (SD =  
3.47) 
    
One-year plea 
2.29 (SD = 
2.95) 
2.94 (SD = 
2.75) 
1.85 (SD = 
1.27) 
    
 
Table 12: Defense Attorneys’ Mean Likelihood Ratings of Accepting Plea 
Agreements 













      
Five-year plea  
3.72 (SD = 
2.91) 
2.67 (SD = 
1.94) 
2.28 (SD = 
1.53) 
    
Three-year plea 
6.56 (SD = 
2.71) 
4.22 (SD =  
2.16) 
4.24 (SD = 
2.22)  
    
One-year plea 
9.22 (SD = 
2.76) 
6.44 (SD = 
2.59) 
7.53 (SD = 
2.85) 
    
 Unsurprisingly, the tables are mirror images of one another. Prosecutors 
indicated they were least likely to offer one-year pleas and defense counsel 
indicated they were most likely to advise accepting one-year pleas, while the 
converse was true for five-year pleas.  Similarly, the more inculpatory the 
forensic evidence, the less likely the prosecutors were to offer a plea and the 
more likely the defense attorneys were to recommend accepting one if offered. 
 Despite the clear pattern in the mean responses, most of the differences are 
not actually statistically significant. For prosecuting attorneys, we did not observe 
statistically significant differences in reported likelihood of offering a five-year, 
three-year, or one-year sentence deal by type of evidence.  We did, however, 
observe that the quality of forensic evidence had a marginally significant effect 
on the likelihood prosecutors indicated they would offer a three-year sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea.82  Prosecuting attorneys who viewed a case containing 
individualizing evidence with a complete match were least likely to offer a three-
year deal, followed by attorneys who viewed a case containing DNA evidence 
with a partial match and associative evidence. 
 We did not observe statistically significant differences in defense attorneys’ 
reported likelihood of accepting a five-year sentence plea bargain under the 
various forensic evidence scenarios, but the hypothetical evidentiary conditions 
did significantly  defense attorneys’ likelihood of accepting a three-year sentence 
in exchange for a guilty plea.83  Because we observed a significant effect of  
evidence type  on the defense attorneys’  likelihood of accepting  a  three-year 
sentence, we conducted a post-hoc Tukey test,  or  a  Tukey HSD (honest 
significant difference test), used  after  an  ANOVA to determine  which of the  
conditions  are significantly different  from each other.  The post-hoc Tukey test 
showed that defense attorneys who viewed a case containing individualizing 
evidence with a complete match were significantly more likely to recommend that 
their client accept a three-year deal84 compared to attorneys who viewed a case 
                                                 
82 F (2,50) = 1.983, p = .1. 
83 F (2,50) = 5.69, p<.01. 
84 M = 6.56 (SD = 2.71). 




containing DNA evidence with a partial match85  or associative evidence.86 We 
also observed a statistically significant difference between conditions in defense 
attorneys’ likelihood of accepting a one-year sentence in exchange for a guilty 
plea. 87  A post-hoc Tukey test showed that defense attorneys who saw the 
individualizing evidence scenario with a complete match were significantly more 
likely to recommend that their client accept a one-year deal88 than attorneys who 
viewed a case containing DNA evidence with a partial match89 or associative 
evidence.90    
 By controlling all extraneous factors and only manipulating forensic evidence 
variables, the experimental survey methodology allows us to draw strong causal 
conclusions about the role that different types of forensic evidence play in 
attorneys’ perceptions of evidence strength, case strength, and the likelihood of 
plea bargains. 
 The results suggest that the strength of forensic evidence plays a role in the 
plea-bargaining process.  For prosecuting attorneys and somewhat for defense 
attorneys, the strength of forensic evidence did not significantly influence 
attorneys’ reported likelihood of offering/accepting plea bargains at the extremes. 
Most prosecutors were likely to offer and most defense attorneys were likely to 
reject a five-year plea bargain, regardless of the strength of forensic evidence in 
the case.  
 However, forensic evidence did play a role when attorneys were considering 
more moderate plea bargains of a three-year sentence.  Defense attorneys were 
significantly more likely to accept a three-year plea offer when their hypothetical 
client was implicated by highly individualizing DNA evidence than they were 
when the client was implicated by associative evidence. We observed similar 
patterns in prosecutors’ willingness to offer a three-year plea bargain – highly 
individualizing DNA evidence conditions were less likely to result in a plea 
bargain offer than less inculpatory partial DNA evidence or glass fragment 
evidence.  
 Relatedly, prosecutors and defense attorneys were also asked about the 
strength of the evidence and the probability they would win if the case were 
brought to trial.  We examined attorneys’ ratings of agreement on a scale of one 
to ten, with higher ratings indicating greater agreement with the statement, “the 
evidence against the defendant in this case was weak.”  
 
 
Table 13: Attorneys’ Mean Ratings of Agreement with Statement, “The 
Evidence Against The Defendant in This Case Was Weak” 
                                                 
85 M = 4.22 (SD = 2.16). 
86 M = 4.24 (SD = 2.22) . 
87 F (2,50) = 4.72,  p = .01. 
88 M = 9.22 (SD = 2.76). 
89 M = 6.44 (SD = 2.59). 
90 M = 7.53 (SD = 2.85). 













      
Prosecutors  
2.76  (SD = 
1.82) 
3.89 (SD = 
1.97) 
4.95 (SD = 
1.82) 
    
Defense Attorneys 
3.06 (SD = 
1.21) 
5.65 (SD = 
.86) 
5.22 (SD =  
1.56) 
 Results were significant for prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. 91 
Defense attorneys who viewed the case with single-source, individualizing DNA 
evidence were significantly less likely to agree with the statement92 than defense 
attorneys who were presented with hypothetical cases featuring partial match 
DNA evidence 93  or associative evidence. 94   We also observed significant 
differences in defense attorneys’ ratings of the probability they would win an 
acquittal if the case were to go to trial.95 Defense attorneys who were presented 
with the complete match DNA evidence scenario were less confident96 that they 
would win an acquittal than attorneys presented with the other two scenarios.97 
 For prosecuting attorneys, we also observed significant differences in 
attorney’s level of agreement with the statement, “the evidence against the 
defendant in this case was weak.” 98   Prosecuting attorneys who viewed the 
complete DNA match case were significantly less likely to agree with the 
statement99 than prosecutors who viewed a case a case containing associative 
evidence100 and ratings for the partial match condition were significantly different 
from the other two groups.101  We did not observe significant differences between 
conditions for prosecuting attorneys ratings of the probability they would win a 
conviction.  
 











      
Prosecutors  
80.0% (SD = 
3.00) 




                                                 
91 The result of the one way ANOVAs: F (2,50) = 21.98), p <.001 
92 M = 3.06  (SD = 1.21). 
93 M = 5.65 (SD = .86). 
94 M  = 5.22 ( SD = 1.56).  This was the result of a post-hoc Tukey. 
95 F (2,50) = 9.14, p <.001 
96 M = 42.2% (SD = 1.86) 
97 M = 66.5% (SD = 2.06).  This was the result of a post-hoc Tukey test. 
98 F (2,52) = 6.3, p <.01. 
99 M = 2.76 (SD = 1.82). 
100 M = 4.95 (SD =  1.82).  This was the result of  a post-hoc Tukey HSD test. 
101 M =3.89 (SD = 1.97). 




    
Defense Attorneys 
42.2% (SD = 
1.86) 
63.3% (SD = 
1.57) 
66.5% (SD 
=  2.06) 
  
 Forensic evidence does affect attorneys’ perceptions of case strength and their 
likelihood of winning at trial. When the defendant was tied to the crime via a 
partial DNA match or glass fragments consistent with the shattered glass at the 
scene, the defense attorneys rated the case as less strong and had more confidence 
they would win at trial than when the case contained an exact, full-profile DNA 
evidence. There was no significant difference in attorneys’ evaluation of partial 
DNA evidence and glass fragment evidence – both were rated as less strong than 
complete DNA evidence.102   
 To summarize, forensic analysis is correlated with whether a case will go to 
trial, but in a fairly complex way. In assessing the forensic evidence, each side 
attempts to predict how the evidence will affect the outcome of a trial.103  
F.  What is the relationship between forensic evidence and conviction? 
 The assessments made by each side are usually based on prior experience, and 
may accurately reflect the actual effects of forensic analysis on trial outcomes. 
We can use our data to objectively estimate the importance of forensic testing on 
trial outcomes. At this stage of the justice process, we can now bring to bear the 
detailed information on the outcomes of testing, and differentiate between the 
effects of inconclusive, exculpatory and inclusive forensic results.  
 Our quantitative analysis focuses on two outcomes: (i) Conviction on any 
charge, (ii) Conviction on the most serious charge.  For each forensic testing 
category (with the exception of drug testing, for which we do not observe test 
results), we construct a set of dummy indicators that correspond to the various 
possible outcomes of the test (as in Table 5 above). We then estimate linear 
probability models as before, using the forensic testing outcome indicators as 
explanatory variables, while conditioning the sample on cases that either pled out 
or went to trial.   
 Table 15 below presents the results. For each forensic evidence category, the 
omitted group corresponds to an inconclusive result (i.e. neither indicating 
exclusion nor inclusion): Thus, all other coefficients are estimated relative to this 
base group.   This choice of omitted category allows us to simultaneously answer 
two questions of interest: First, what is the estimate for no forensic testing, relative 
to a situation in which forensic testing is conducted but does not turn up any 
conclusive result, i.e. is there a "placebo effect" of testing? Second, to what extent 
does a probative result matter? Implicitly, the reference category in this question 
is a situation in which testing is conducted but does not turn up a probative result. 
 
                                                 
102 See Bushway et al, supra note 60 at 740 (study using similar methodology to measure effect 
of different kinds of evidence on plea bargaining outcomes). 
103 See id. (finding support for “shadow of trial” hypothesis that plea bargaining will reflect 
predictions about likely trial outcomes).  




Table 15: Association of forensic test outcomes with conviction  
   
  (1) (2) 
 
Conviction on any 
charge 
Conviction on most 
serious charge 
      
Trace evidence (Omitted category=Evidence 
analyzed but inconclusive)   
Not analyzed -0.054 -0.124 
 (0.074) (0.089) 
Exclusion -0.032 -0.019 
 (0.085) (0.108) 
Inclusion 0.007 0.051 
 (0.073) (0.087) 
   
Drug analysis -0.213 0.056 
 (0.131) (0.117) 
   
DNA evidence (Omitted category=Evidence 
analyzed but inconclusive)   
Not analyzed 0.005 -0.073 
 (0.118) (0.147) 
Exclusion 0.071 0.183 
 (0.138) (0.161) 
Weak inclusion 0.226** 0.277* 
 (0.115) (0.146) 
Strong inclusion 0.140 0.095 
 (0.111) (0.142) 
   
Firearms evidence (Omitted 
category=Evidence analyzed but inconclusive)   
Not analyzed 0.034 -0.026 
 (0.059) (0.071) 
Exclusion -0.266 -0.319 
 (0.186) (0.215) 
Inclusion 0.043 -0.006 
 (0.071) (0.088) 
   
CODIS match (Omitted category=No match 
obtained)   
Search not performed 0.070 0.049 
 (0.067) (0.094) 
Match 0.166*** 0.142 
 (0.064) (0.101) 
   
NIBIN match (Omitted category=No match 
obtained)   
Search not performed -0.034 0.043 
 (0.054) (0.072) 




Match 0.006 -0.176 
 (0.167) (0.222) 
   
Observations 698 698 
R-squared 0.072 0.139 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for jurisdiction 
fixed effects, offense fixed effects, victim and arrestee gender and race. The regression 
samples are restricted to cases in which charges were filed but which were not dismissed 
or diverted. 
  
With the necessary caveat about sample size, the results tell a story that is largely 
consistent with the findings from our qualitative interviews and the experimental 
survey.  Inculpatory forensic evidence, particularly DNA and CODIS results, is 
associated with increased conviction probability. There is only a weak suggestion, 
however, that exculpatory forensic evidence matters: The coefficient on 
exclusionary trace evidence and exclusionary firearms evidence possess the right 
signs, but are poorly estimated.  In general, as one would expect, the mere fact of 
analysis does not appear to predict conviction, as indicated by the fact that none 
of the coefficients on the “Not analyzed” indicators is statistically significant 
(although given our sample size and the standard errors we cannot confidently 
rule out non-zero effects). 
 It is also worth noting the possibility of a form of reverse causality  -- that 
forensic evidence testing is the result of the perceived importance/strength of the 
case instead of the cause.   This might be the result of the widespread perception 
on the part of prosecutors that jurors now had heightened and unrealistic 
expectations for forensic evidence, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the 
“CSI Effect.” 104   Prosecutors indicated that juror expectations are indeed an 
important factor in the decision to test forensic evidence 105  and have crime 
laboratory personnel testify at trial.106 While a few prosecutors acknowledged that 
                                                 
104 See, e.g. Kathianne Boniello, “’CSI’ has Ruined the American Justice System,” New York 
Post,  September 27, 2015 (interviewing several prosecutors and defense attorneys about jurors’ 
newly-heightened expectations for forensic evidence). 
105Anonymous interview with assistant district attorney: 
Yes, we test [forensic evidence] to allay jury concerns. You need to prove your case 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defense can make it an issue if [evidence] wasn’t 
tested. You kind of have to draw that balance: I may have 29 pieces to test, but it’s not 
practical, it’s not economical [to test them all].  We have to balance what to do. In one 
case I had to test cat and dog hairs and human hairs. I had already maxed out our lab 
with testing.  I had already spent a lot. I had to try to balance: the evidence was 
probative, not as probative as what we get for humans, so we did [trace analysis] 
microscopic hair comparison. We were able to say these hairs are consistent with the 
suspect’s pet’s. 
 
106Anonymous interview with assistant district attorney: 
I think that their expectations have gotten much higher.  Back when I started if we had an 
8x10 color photo we were in great shape.  Now they want DNA on everything. It does two 




jurors had actually become savvier about forensic evidence, making it easier to 
present, more often juror expectations for forensic evidence were described as 
unrealistically high.107 The practice of testing forensic evidence to appease jurors 
rather than generate probative evidence may contribute to our findings.  
 Are concerns about forensic testing turnaround time warranted?   
 This is an especially intriguing question because the refrain heard so often in 
our interviews--the wish nearly every detective and prosecutor shared about their 
crime laboratory--was for increased capacity to complete requests more quickly.  
 




Bexar Sedgwick Overall 
Hair 237 . 55.5 92.27 . 88.82 
Fibers . . 30 85.88 . 74.7 
FTIR . 55.5 8.56 159.2 . 61.5 
SEM_EDX 299.11 . 52.44 41.06 . 75.7 
Fit match 39 . . 59 . 52.33 
Serology 
Screen 
124.16 108.71 . 22.46 . 64.03 
Blood pattern 
interpretation 
. 209 . . . 209 
YSTR  . 39 . 8 . 28.67 
GC_MS . 55.5 10.66 . 47.69 14.57 
Drug ID 115.57 . . 3 34.83 71.8 
STR 88.09 105.11 290.24 55.12 66.56 135.2 
Test fire 288 233.75 89.69 244.89 26.72 162.95 
Comparison 
scope 
200.52 247.86 104.5 272.88 44.17 171.37 
Notes: Averages are calculated conditional on analysis being completed within the 
time-frame covered by the study 
 
 Looking at the average turnaround times for forensic testing our case sample 
in Table 16, one can understand why this concern was so often voiced. Few 
categories of testing have a mean analysis time under a month, and for many the 
average is closer to three or four months, which means the wait for crime 
laboratory results may sometimes be much longer. 108  Moreover, the average 
turnaround times calculated here are conditional on analysis having been 
                                                 
things: we either send things to the lab, or we have someone from the lab testify to why it 
wasn’t done.  We do that much more often than we used to. 
 
107 Several mentioned making a standard statement during voir dire to explain that the recovery 
of probative forensic evidence from a crime scene is not inevitable, and that many cases are 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt with only direct evidence. 
108 Table 26 has empty cells because some tests and technologies were not available at the local 
crime lab or not used in the sample of cases.  




completed within the timeframe of the data that we collected, and therefore 
probably underestimate actual turnaround times by eliminating requests that had 
not been completed during the time of our study.   
 During our interviews, detectives and prosecutors were asked if forensic 
evidence testing delays ever enabled a suspect in a case of theirs, who would have 
been arrested had the test results been known, to commit additional crimes. Most 
said no, but several expressed a vague awareness that this had happened at some 
point in the jurisdiction, and two were able to recall specific cases. Apart from 
this scenario, interviewees said testing delays contributed to witness memory 
erosion, sometimes necessitated dropping and re-filing charges to comply with 
speedy trial requirements or sending items to private laboratories for rush analysis 
at a premium cost. Several prosecutors were quick to add, however, that their local 
crime lab tries to accommodate rush requests. A few also noted that lengthy 
adjudication times (years) are often due to crowded dockets, defense 
continuations or other factors unrelated to the crime lab’s turnaround.      
  
 Does the institutional configuration of the crime laboratory have any effect 
on its productivity? 
 In light of these findings, it is natural to ask what determines turnaround times. 
In general, turnaround time is a function not only of crime lab constraints, but of 
other case circumstances that make the analysis more or less time sensitive. How 
a case is progressing through the investigation and judicial processes (e.g. whether 
or not there is a suspect in custody, how prepared the prosecution and defense is 
for trial) will have a bearing on turnaround time. From a policy perspective, 
however, we would like to understand if there are specific institutional/structural 
factors that affect the efficiency of forensic evidence processing? We attempt to 
answer this question by using the Census of Forensic Labs data to estimate the 
relation between crime laboratory output and the “inputs.” We use the notion of a 
production function as a useful organizing framework. Consider the following 
functional relationship between lab clearance rate (i.e. cases cleared during the 
calendar year as a fraction of the total number of requests received by the lab) and 
inputs: 
 
𝑌 = Φ 𝐿 𝐵  
 
where 𝑌  is the clearance rate of lab i in year t, 𝐿  is the average number of full-
time laboratory employees per case, 𝐵  is the average operating budget per case 
(as a proxy for "capital", i.e. equipment) and Φ  represents an index of the 
laboratory's technical efficiency (analogous to the economic literature on 
production functions, Φ  can be intepreted as Total Factor Productivity). Writing 
this equation in logs, we have: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛽𝑏 + 𝜙  
 




where lower-case letters now denote logarithms of the original variables.  
 We first estimate the effect of workforce and budgets on crime lab output. 
These effects are represented by the coefficients α and β, which can be seen to be 
the elasticity of “output” (i.e. case clearance rate) with respect to L and B 
respectively. We estimate these coefficients by means of an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression of y on l and b. That this may not yield unbiased estimates of α 
and β follows from the possibility that labs that are more productive may receive 
greater budget allocations and may also be able to increase their workforce. This 
would imply that the unobserved productivity term 𝜙  is correlated with l and b, 
thereby biasing the estimates of their partial effects. A straightforward solution to 
this problem is to use the panel dimension of the data: The fact that each 
laboratory is observed multiple times allows us to utilize a fixed-effects estimation 
strategy that controls for the unobserved productivity term. The key assumption 
underlying this method is that lab productivity is fixed over time.109 
    Our interest also lies in understanding the underlying determinants of lab 
efficiency, i.e. we would like to unpack 𝜙 . We think certain factors may play a 
key role, namely (i) the incentive structure, in terms of the laboratory’s funding 
sources, (ii) organizational structure, in terms of controlling authority, and (iii) 
the use of an electronic lab management system (LIMS). Information on funding 
sources is only available for the 2005 and 2009 rounds of the census. We capture 
incentive structure in a single variable that represents the percentage of funding 
that the lab receives from fees, as opposed to funding from grants and local and 
state governments, the hypothesis being that labs that are oriented towards fee-
for-service are likely to face greater pressures to be efficient. While organizational 
structure is difficult to fully capture, we include indicators for whether the lab is 
a state lab, a county lab or a municipal lab.110  
    Because these factors are (almost completely) time-invariant, the fixed-effects 
estimation will tend to sweep them out and thus make it impossible to estimate 
their effects. Instead, we utilize the approach suggested by Hausman and 
Taylor.111 We begin by writing out the productivity term as follows: 
 
𝜙 = 𝜆 + 𝜆 𝐹𝑒𝑒 + 𝜆 𝑂𝑟𝑔 + 𝜆 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆 + 𝜖  
 
                                                 
109 A more sophisticated approach would be required if in fact productivity were thought to be 
evolving over time. Because the data at hand are not rich enough to implement the more 
advanced methods that have been suggested in the literature on production function estimation, 
we restrict ourselves to the simpler fixed-effects estimation.  For examples in this literature see 
e.g. S. Olley & A. Pakes, A. The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry.  64 ECONOMETRICA 1263-1295 (1996); J. Levinsohn, J. & A. Petrin, 
Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables, 46 THE REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC STUDIES 317-342 (2003); and M. Arellano & S. Bond, Some Tests of Specification 
for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, 58 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 277-297 (1991).  
110 Federal labs are excluded from the analysis. 
111 J. Hausman & W.E. Taylor, Panel Data and Individual Fixed Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 
1377-1398 (1981). 




    where 𝐹𝑒𝑒  is the fraction of funding from fees, 𝑂𝑟𝑔  is a variable representing 
the organizational structure of the lab, 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆  is an indicator for whether the lab 
uses a LIMS and 𝜖  is a residual term. We can now substitute () into () to write: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼𝑙 + 𝛽𝑏 + 𝜆 + 𝜆 𝐹𝑒𝑒 + 𝜆 𝑂𝑟𝑔 + 𝜆 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆 + 𝜖  
 
    Under the assumption that 𝐹𝑒𝑒 , 𝑂𝑟𝑔  and 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆  are uncorrelated with 𝜖 , the 
Hausman-Taylor works by estimating the equation above using two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) to instrument the endogenous variables l and b with their 
deviations from their respective means, 𝑙 − 𝑙  and 𝑏 − 𝑏 . The critical 
assumption is that 𝐹𝑒𝑒 , 𝑂𝑟𝑔  and 𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑆   are exogenous to unobserved elements 
of lab productivity. While this assumption cannot be tested, we attempt to increase 
its plausibility by including state and year fixed effects in the regression. 
    Table 17 below presents the results from the various regressions. Column 1 
presents the results from a simple OLS regression of y on l and b. Column 2 adds 
state and year fixed effects to the specification. Column 3 adds laboratory fixed 
effects. Finally, Column 4 presents the results from the 2SLS regression.  
 
Table 17: Estimating the lab production function 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
l (log of employees per case) 0.12** 0.16** 0.32* 0.51* 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) (0.26) 
b (log of budget per case) 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
Percent funding from fees    0.60*** 
    (0.22) 
LIMS    0.42* 
    (0.25) 
State lab    -0.09 
    (0.09) 
County lab    -0.06 
    (0.19) 
Observations 627 487 627 245 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses have been clustered at the 
level of the laboratory 
 
 The estimated elasticity of output with respect to labor per case increases as 
we move from the simplest (i.e. least demanding) specification to the 2SLS 
specification, and is statistically significant throughout. In contrast, the 
estimated elasticity of output with respect to operating budget is small and 
insignificant in all specifications. The 2SLS results reveal that fee-for-service 
creates a strong incentive effect: A 1 percentage point increase in funding from 
fees is estimated to increase case clearance rates by about 6%. The effect of 
employing a LIMS is also significant, increasing clearance rates by 40%. 
However, neither of the lab jurisdiction variables is found to have a significant 




effect, although we must again emphasize that these variables may only be weak 
proxies for organizational structure.  
 Of course productivity is not the only important aspect of institutional 
configuration: credibility and reputation are crucial as well. In our qualitative 
interviews we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the lab’s 
institutional configuration with detectives, prosecutors, and forensic scientists. 
Our study sites were somewhat diverse in terms of affiliation: three are 
independent, one is under the authority of the district attorney, and one is part of 
a state law enforcement agency that rarely uses it, conferring its own kind of 
autonomy.  
 Detectives, and prosecutors in jurisdictions with independent labs were 
mostly inclined to think that set up was ideal, enhancing the labs’ objectivity and 
the credibility of expert witnesses at trial. A few prosecutors opined that 
different agendas (scientific versus adversarial, efficiency versus thoroughness) 
sometimes created friction that would be attenuated by association with law 
enforcement or the DA’s office.   
 Crime lab personnel also felt that independence enhanced their individual 
and collective credibility. In Sacramento, two of the forensic scientists we 
interviewed said that if they could change one thing about the laboratory it 
would be to make its institutional configuration independent. However, 
laboratory personnel at independent laboratories noted that the separation made 
it harder to develop and maintain good working relationships, and thus to ensure 
detectives are well-trained in recognition, documentation, and preservation of 
forensic evidence.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 First, we return to our original research questions: 
(1) What is the perceived utility of forensic analysis? How often is forensic 
evidence collected, how often is it analyzed, and when is it analyzed? 
We note substantial diversity in the practice of the collection of forensic 
evidence.  There appears to be little uniformity, even among relatively large 
departments, about the collection of forensic evidence in reported crimes other 
than homicide.  If there is any common thread among our varied jurisdictions, it 
is the low rate of collection of forensic evidence in burglary and robbery 
reported crimes.  
 Second, we note considerable differences in the rate at which collected 
evidence is analyzed.  This ranges from a high of 83% in San Antonio to a low 
of 19% in Seattle.  Once again, the common thread was the low rate of forensic 
evidence analysis for reported robberies (<5%) and burglaries (<2%). 
 Third, forensic evidence is seldom analyzed prior to arrest. While there was 
considerable variation among sites, ranging from a high of 11.3% rate of pre-
arrest firearms analysis in San Antonio to .7% in Seattle, in all categories of 




evidence, it was less than 12% and usually much lower.  With few exceptions, 
the police in our sites were not using forensic evidence to identify suspects. 
 This is unfortunate. Pre-arrest suspect identification seems a stage at which 
the objectivity of forensic evidence and its lack of correlation with other sources 
of information about a suspect would recommend its use.  
(2) What are the outcomes of forensic evidence testing? How often does 
forensic evidence testing yield useful information? 
As noted above, in most reported crimes, forensic evidence is not analyzed.  In 
crimes in which it is analyzed, it often yields inconclusive results, though this 
depends on the specific type of evidence analyzed. Forensic DNA and firearms 
testing results in excluding a suspect about twice as often as it results in 
supporting the case. 
(3) What is the relationship between forensic evidence testing, arrest, and 
charging decisions? 
 Some kinds of forensic evidence are associated with an increase in arrest 
rates, but it is difficult to interpret because very little forensic analysis occurs 
prior to arrest and charging. DNA analysis was associated with about a nineteen 
percent increase in the probability of arrest in homicide cases. 
 Once arrest was controlled for, forensic evidence did not generally impact 
the likelihood of charges being filed. This was generally consistent with what 
we heard in our interviews, where prosecutors noted that arrests were usually 
made only in cases in which there was strong enough evidence to file charges. 
(4) How does forensic evidence affect the plea-bargaining process? 
Cases in which trace evidence is tested and found inconclusive or exclusionary 
are associated with pleas.  In contrast, if the forensic trace analysis results in an 
inclusion, the case is more likely to go to trial. If DNA testing results in a weak 
inclusion, the case is more likely to plead out. If DNA testing results in a strong 
inclusion, the case is more likely to go to trial, partly, as interview comments 
and the evidence scenario experiment suggest, because the prosecution is less 
willing to offer an attractive plea agreement to the defendant.   CODIS matches, 
however, tend to significantly decrease the chance of dismissal and increase the 
probability of plea bargain. 
 Our qualitative interviews found wide variation as to whether forensic 
evidence testing was performed prior to plea-bargaining. While some 
prosecutors reported wanting the results of forensic testing so they understood 
how strong of case they had, other prosecutors reported that they did not usually 
have them during plea-bargaining. 
 The results of the experimental survey study showed that forensic evidence 
played a role in the plea-bargaining process, particularly in the middle range of 
cases in which a three-year plea bargain was at issue. A case in which there is 
stronger forensic evidence against the defendant is less likely to prompt the 
prosecutor to offer a plea bargain, and the defense counsel is more likely to 
counsel the defendant to accept it.  
 (5) What is the relationship between forensic evidence and conviction? 




 In our quantitative analysis, we found that forensic evidence matters at the 
trial stage when it provides conclusive evidence. Both inclusive and 
exclusionary evidence affect the likelihood of conviction on the most serious 
charges, with DNA having the most important effect.  
 We also found in the qualitative interviews that most prosecutors sometimes 
ordered forensic testing to meet unrealistic juror expectations. The testing may 
also reflect other aspects about the strength of the case that we are unable to 
observe.  
 Our experimental survey found that attorneys evaluated the likelihood of 
conviction in cases with DNA evidence as being higher than in cases with less 
individualizing forensic evidence. 
 (6) Are concerns about forensic testing turnaround time warranted?    
 Lengthy turnaround times are significantly associated with a decreased 
probability of conviction and shorter sentences. It is difficult to determine 
whether this is because law enforcement prioritizes testing in strong or high-
profile cases, or whether the delay itself is leading to this effect. 
 While police, crime lab, and prosecutor interviewees agreed that delays in 
analysis are a function of investigative priority, the lower the capacity, the more 
likely even critical analyses will not be completed in a timely manner.  
Analytical delays are a nuisance to law enforcement, but don’t seem to enable 
criminals. However, longer turnaround times may contribute to unjust treatment 
for individuals who are wrongly detained pretrial.112 
 Delays are also likely to lead to forensic testing being prioritized for cases 
going to trial.  This may put pressure on forensic personnel to confirm the 
prosecution’s theory of the case and overworked lab personnel may face 
pressure to cut corners.  
 (7) What is the relationship between the institutional configuration of crime 
laboratories and their productivity? 
 Fee-based laboratories appear to have a substantial positive effect on 
clearance rates, implying efficiency gains in terms of more careful use of the 
crime laboratory by police and prosecutors, which may in turn free analysts to 
work submitted cases more thoroughly.  
 Employing a Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) is also 
associated with increased productivity, increasing forensic test clearance rates 
by 40%, though having a LIMS may be a proxy for other variables we are 
unable to observe. 
 While we found that crime laboratory organizational affiliation is 
uncorrelated with clearance rates, this has no straightforward interpretation 
because the organizational affiliation variable was weakly specified. As a result, 
                                                 
112 See, e.g. Ryan Gabrielson, Unreliable and Unchallenged, Pro Publica, October 28, 2016.  
https://www.propublica.org/article/unreliable-and-unchallenged (noting Las Vegas police use 
inaccurate road-side drug testing with high false positive rate; delays in lab testing lead to 
wrongful guilty pleas). 




it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the effect of crime lab 
organizational affiliation. 
 In the course of this study we made a number of other observations.  The 
problem of antiquated, siloed data storage is considerable. In our study 
jurisdictions, lab information management systems (LIMS) were not evolved 
enough for our data to be gleaned electronically.  Manual compilation of the 
data was necessary for our study.  Law enforcement records management 
systems and court processing information systems were both vastly superior.      
 What can be done to improve the production and use of forensic science? 
First, we observed large variation in nearly every aspect of forensic evidence use 
and testing across our sample jurisdictions, with testing rates varying 
substantially by jurisdiction. While it is possible that these variations are 
efficient accommodations to local conditions, this seems highly unlikely.  Best 
practices should be identified and adopted nationally for the collection, testing, 
and use of forensic evidence. The huge variation we observed strongly suggests 
there is substantial room for improvement on this front. 
 Second, there is very little use of forensic evidence prior to arrest and 
charging.  This is partly a function of the political economy of forensic testing.  
Partly as a result of limited resources, testing in cases that are going to trial is 
prioritized over other cases. This means that use of forensic evidence for 
investigation or identification of a suspect rarely occurs.  Efforts to encourage 
the use of the forensic science in the investigatory process, pre-arrest, would 
likely help realize the potential of forensic science.  This could be furthered by 
either dedicating forensic lab resources to investigation or by increasing forensic 
lab capacities. It may also require a cultural shift to reduce the priority placed on 
forensic testing for cases going to trial and to increase the use of forensic 
evidence in the investigative phase of the case. 
 The practice of prioritizing forensic testing for cases going to trial, while 
understandable, leads to two unintended consequences.  First, forensic evidence 
is unavailable to investigators who must develop theories based on other 
potentially incomplete or more fallible means.  This can lead to unnecessarily 
unsolved cases if the forensic evidence could generate a lead or wrongful arrests 
if other less reliable evidence suggests another suspect. 
 Second, delaying forensic testing also increases pressure on forensic 
personnel for results that are consistent with the investigators or prosecution’s 
existing theory of the case.   Testing that might have disclosed an erroneous lead 
had it been performed initially, now might disclose a wrongful arrest or an 
erroneous prosecution, outcomes that are potentially embarrassing and/or 
politically damaging to elected officials.  The timing of the testing raises the 
stakes of the results and places lab personnel under considerable pressure.  
While we have no doubt that the vast majority of forensic science personnel are 
ethical and will testify truthfully regardless of the consequences, it also seems 
ill-advised to construct a system that unnecessarily places such pressure on 
fallible human beings.  The fact that forensic evidence played a leading role in 
many wrongful convictions may be a result.    




 We also observed that fee-based laboratories have higher clearance rates.  
This suggests that using a pricing system to guide the use of forensic testing may 
improve its efficiency and reduce lab backlogs.  
 Finally, we noted that employing a lab information management system was 
associated with higher productivity rates among labs.  We were surprised at how 
little integration of the lab information systems with police, prosecution, or court 
information systems. Ideally, authorized parties (including the courts and the 
defense) could access lab reports and the raw data directly. This increased 
transparency and oversight would increase confidence in our system of forensic 
science and perhaps reduce the incidence of lab scandals.   
 Over the last several years, the all too human imperfections of the criminal 
justice system have received increasing attention. In addition to wrongful 
convictions,113 and racial bias in policing, commentators have noted that many 
jurisdictions have declining case clearance rates.114 William Blackstone 
famously suggested that it may be better to let ten guilty persons go free than to 
convict a single innocent person,115 but neither outcome is ideal, and our current 
justice system produces far too much of both.   
 We remain convinced that forensic science has considerable potential to 
improve the accuracy and reliability of the criminal justice system.  By being 
relatively independent of the conventional police investigative process, it can, in 
theory, provide a decoupled check116 and reduce errors of both inclusion and 
exclusion – that is the wrongfully convicted, the wrongfully acquitted, and 
unsolved crimes.  But our results also show the vast gap between the theoretical 
potential of scientific evidence and its use in practice.   
 In theory, it can be used to identify suspects in a wide range of offenses.  In 
practice, however, the use of forensic evidence is rare outside homicide, and its 
use almost always following arrest. In theory, it can be a truly independent 
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verification of a suspect’s guilt or innocence.  In practice, however, we found 
that the lab typically worked closely with law enforcement, and usually knew in 
advance of testing what detectives and prosecutors were hoping to prove.117 In 
theory, charging decisions are affected by the availability of forensic evidence.  
In practice, we found that prosecutors often did not have the results of forensic 
analyses at the time of charging. In theory, jurors correctly understand the 
probative weight of forensic evidence as well as its limits and reasons for its 
absence. In practice, prosecutors and law enforcement believe that jurors harbor 
unrealistic beliefs about it and that testing is often conducted to address these 
unrealistic beliefs rather than to actually generate probative evidence.  In fact, 
some of our results may be best understood as a result of this reverse causation. 
Rather than forensic science shaping the subsequent investigation, arrest rates, 
and charging decisions, forensic evidence is often only tested if prosecutors and 
investigators believe they have an otherwise strong case. While this form of 
triage may be understandable given the scarcity of forensic testing resources, the 
absence of forensic testing in the investigatory stage can lead to unsolved cases 
or the criminal justice system focusing on the wrong person.  Delaying forensic 
testing until late in the criminal process can also place pressure on the forensic 
science personnel to produce results that are consistent with the existing theory 
of the case. 
 Many other professions and industries (e.g. manufacturing, aviation and 
medicine) have focused on designing systems with independent decoupled 
processes to reduce the chance that the inevitable human lapse will lead to a 
catastrophic error in the outcome of the system.118 Decoupling reduces the 
interdependencies in the system and the effect of a single mistake on the 
outcome of the system.  Forensic science has the potential to be such a critical 
independent process for the criminal justice system and thereby improve 
reliability and reduce errors -- both unsolved crimes and wrongful convictions.  
But the use of forensic science we observed – uneven and late in the criminal 
justice process – will be unable to fulfill this considerable promise.  
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